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 ECONOPHYSICS: A NEW CHALLENGE 
FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMICS? 
 BY 
 FRANCK  JOVANOVIC AND  CHRISTOPHE  SCHINCKUS 
 Financial economics was born in the 1960s. It took less than two decades for the 
new discipline’s main theoretical results to become established, creating what is 
considered to be mainstream fi nancial economics. Less than thirty years later, a 
new fi eld of research called “econophysics” was created. This fi eld aims to reinvent 
modern fi nancial theory and, indirectly, fi nancial economics. 
 This article proposes to study, by an historical analysis, to what extent econophysics 
today could constitute one of the major theoretical challenges to fi nancial economics. 
It shows how these two fi elds have historical similarities, and analyzes how these 
similarities call the future evolution of fi nancial theory into question. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Financial economics was born in the 1960s. It took less than two decades for the new 
discipline’s main theoretical results (effi cient market theory, option pricing model, 
CAPM, and modern portfolio theory) to become established, creating what is considered 
to be mainstream fi nancial economics.  1  And, although several later theoretical movements 
in fi nancial economics (for example, behavioral fi nance and microstructure of fi nancial 
markets) have tried to challenge its pre-eminence, the mainstream approach remains 
dominant in fi nancial economics.  2  Less than thirty years later, a new fi eld of research 
called “econophysics” was created. This fi eld was created outside fi nancial economics 
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1
 On the history of mainstream fi nancial economics, see Bernstein ( 1992 ), Jovanovic ( 2008 ), Melhring 
( 2005 ,  2012 ), Poitras and Jovanovic ( 2007 ,  2010 ), or Whitley ( 1986a ). 
 
2
 In line with Frickel and Gross (2005, 208), the adjective “dominant” is used here to signify a progressive 
movement that urges a revival of past ideas to push the fi eld forwards in new directions. Dominance must 
not be associated with the idea of truth but rather with the ability to provide a progressive evolution of 
knowledge. In our view, econophysics is not truer than fi nancial economics but, as we will show, by solving 
old problems observed in fi nance, it offers a progressive perspective for fi nancial economics. 
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by physicists from statistical physics. It studies economic phenomena and, more 
specifi cally, fi nancial markets by using models and concepts imported from condensed 
matter and statistical physics, a very specifi c area of physics.  3  In other words, econo-
physics is characterized by the application to fi nancial markets of models from statistical 
physics that use stable Lévy processes.  4  Econophysics, which represents itself as 
a new paradigm, aims to reinvent modern fi nancial theory and, indirectly, fi nancial 
economics. This article proposes to study, by an historical analysis, to what extent 
econophysics today could constitute one of the major theoretical challenges to fi nancial 
economics. 
 Using hypotheses and mathematical models that fi nancial economists did not or 
could not develop when their discipline was taking shape in the 1960s, econophysicists 
are achieving better simulations of stock-price variations and thus providing more 
accurate forecasts than those obtained from most models used in fi nancial economics 
(Roehner  2002 , McCauley  2004 ). This situation could pose a considerable challenge 
to fi nancial economics, which established itself in the 1960s and 1970s, because it 
claimed, among other things, to provide better forecasts than rival theories at the time. 
In addition, the mathematical formalisms used by econophysicists today exist in a more 
general mathematical framework than those currently used in fi nancial economics. 
These two advantages of econophysics raise the question of whether, and to what 
extent, it could replace fi nancial economics as the dominant approach in modern fi nancial 
theory. Were econophysics to become dominant, its assumptions, theoretical framework, 
and results would form a reference, with other currents positioning themselves and 
their own work in relation to it. 
 In seeking to address this question, this article is divided into two parts. 
 The fi rst part highlights the historical similarities between the emergence of fi nancial 
economics in the 1960s and that of econophysics in the 1990s. We begin by describing 
the birth of fi nancial economics and then the emergence of econophysics. By means of 
a comparative analysis, we will then show that the factors that led to the development 
of both fi nancial economics and econophysics are identical: the role played by modern 
probability theory and by empirical data, and claims on the same scientifi c criteria. 
 These similarities call the future evolution of fi nancial theory into question. Since 
econophysics has followed the same development path as fi nancial economics, and 
since the empirical results and mathematical models of econophysics correspond more 
closely to empirical data, it is reasonable to ask whether econophysics might take over 
fi nancial economics, just as fi nancial economics took over from earlier approaches 
to fi nance in business schools. This is the question addressed in the second part. We 
 
3
 The infl uence of physics on fi nancial economics is nothing new and has been well documented in the 
literature. But in spite of the theoretical and historical links between physics and fi nancial economics, 
econophysics represents a fundamentally new approach that differs from preceding infl uences. Its practitioners 
are not economists taking their inspiration from the work of physicists to develop their discipline; this time, 
it is physicists who are studying various problems brought to light by the methods of the social sciences. 
 On the history of econophysics, see Jovanovic and Schinckus ( 2013 ) or Roehner ( 2002 ). 
 
4
 Of course, statistical physics cannot be reduced to the use of Lévy processes: it goes back much earlier, to 
the work of Gibbs and those of Boltzmann. However, econophysics focuses on this very specifi c class of 
models. The consequence is that today the literature of econophysics is (not only but) mainly based on the 
application of the Lévy processes to fi nancial economics—see Gingras and Schinckus ( 2012 ) for a 
bibliometric study of this point. 
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discuss econophysics’ two principal theoretical advantages: better forecasting of 
stock-market variations, and a more general statistical framework. We then offset these 
advantages by looking at the two main hindrances to econophysics’ chances of 
challenging the dominant approach in fi nancial economics: the poor dialogue between 
economists and physicists, and the reluctance of econophysicists to take up the 
hypotheses of fi nancial economics. Our analysis of the advantages and disadvantages 
provides an historical perspective of the challenges to fi nancial economics raised by 
the emergence of econophysics. 
 II.  SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TODAY AND THE 1960S 
 This section provides a comparative analysis of the emergence of the two disciplines 
that concern us. It shows that the birth of econophysics in the 1990s follows the same 
pattern as the birth of fi nancial economics in the 1960s. We will focus particularly on 
two major similarities: fi rst, the role played by modern probability theory and by 
empirical data; and, second, the manner in which these new scientifi c communities 
were constituted. 
 Historical Echoes 
 The Birth of Financial Economics 
 As this section reminds us, fi nancial economics owes its institutional birth in the 1960s 
to three elements: access to the tools of modern probability theory; the creation of new 
empirical data; and the extension of the analysis framework of economics.  5  
 On the accessibility of the tools of modern probability theory .  Financial economics is 
intimately bound up with modern probability theory, from which its emergence, 
main models, and results are inseparable. So close are the links that, further to the 
publications of Harrison and Kreps (Harrison and Kreps  1979 ) and Harrison and 
Pliska ( 1981 ),  6  some authors have suggested that economics has been dispossessed 
of fi nancial theory, which has since resembled an application of modern probability 
theory (MacKenzie  2006 , pp. 140–141). Or, as posited by Davis and Etheridge, 
Harrison and Pliska’s article (1981) “has turned ‘fi nancial economics’ into ‘mathematical 
fi nance’” (Davis and Etheridge  2006 , p. 114). 
 Modern probability theory—probability for continuous quantities in continuous 
time—emerged in the 1930s (Von Plato  1994 ) out of a number of works aimed at 
renewing traditional probability theory. The development of the modern version of 
probability theory was directly based on measure theory (Shafer and Vovk  2001 ). The 
connection was made by Kolmogorov, who proposed the main founding concepts of 
this new branch of mathematics. 
 
5
 On the emergence of fi nancial economics, see Jovanovic ( 2008 ,  2009b ,  2009a ), Jovanovic and Schinckus 
( 2010 ), MacKenzie ( 2006 ), and Whitley ( 1986a ). 
 
6
 These two publications gave a rigorous mathematical framework to defi nitions, hypotheses, and results 
that constitute the heart of modern fi nancial theory. 
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 From these beginnings in the 1930s, modern probability theory developed and became 
increasingly infl uential. But it was not until after World War II that Kolmogorov’s 
axioms came to dominate this discipline (Shafer and Vovk  2005 , pp. 54–55). It was 
also after World War II that the American probability school was born, led by Doob  7  
and by Feller,  8  who proved, on the basis of the framework laid down by Kolmogorov, 
all results obtained prior to the 1950s, thereby enabling them to be accepted and 
integrated into the discipline’s theoretical corpus. These 1950s works led to the creation 
of a stable corpus that was accessible to non-specialists. From then on, the models and 
results of modern probability theory were used in the study of fi nancial markets in a 
more systematic manner, in particular by scholars educated in economics. 
 The fi rst step in this development was the dissemination of mathematical tools 
enabling the properties of random variables to be used and uncertainty reasoning to be 
developed. The fi rst two writers to use tools that came out of modern probability theory 
to study fi nancial markets were Harry Markowitz and A. D. Roy. In 1952, each published 
an article on the theory of portfolio choice theory.  9  Both used mathematical properties 
of random variables to build their model.  10  Their work was to re-prove a result that had 
long been known (and that was as old as the adage “Don’t put all your eggs in one 
basket”), using a new mathematical language, that of modern probability theory. Their 
contribution lay not in the result of portfolio diversifi cation, but in the use of this new 
mathematical language. 
 From the 1960s on, a new stage was embarked upon: authors no longer limited 
themselves to proving past results using the mathematical formalisms of modern 
probability theory, but connected mathematical formalism with the main concepts of 
economics, particularly the concept of equilibrium, to create new theories. 
 The effi cient markets theory,  11  which can be considered as the fi rst theory built by 
fi nancial economists, provides a good example. This theory was initially referred 
to as the “random walk theory.” This term stresses the importance of mathematical 
formalism in the way issues were tackled before the discipline was constituted. The 
theory, fi rst formulated by Fama ( 1965b ), made it possible to link the mathematical 
model of a stochastic process with one of the keystones of economics, the concept of 
economic equilibrium (Jovanovic  2010 ). In 1970, Fama based the effi cient markets 
theory on another mathematical concept that came from modern probability theory: 
the martingale model.  12  For Fama’s purposes, the most important attraction of the 
 
7
 Doob is without question the American mathematician who has had the greatest infl uence on modern 
probability theory in the United States. On Doob, see Bingham ( 2005 ). 
 
8
 William Feller emigrated to the United States in 1939. He was one of the fi rst defenders of the axiomatization 
proposed by Kolmogorov (Shafer et al.  2005 ). Moreover, Feller’s  An Introduction to Probability Theory 
and Its Application (1950) was, like Doob’s 1953 publications, one of the works that most strongly infl uenced 
modern probability theory in the United States. 
 
9
 For a retrospective on Markowitz, see Rubinstein ( 2002 ) and Markowitz ( 1999 ). 
 
10
 The mathematical properties of random variables are that the expected value of a weighted sum is the 
weighted sum of the expected values, while the variance of a weighted sum is not the weighted sum of the 
variances (because we have to take covariance into account). 
 
11
 This theory is sometimes called an “hypothesis.” But, from a methodological point of view, it is a fully 
fl edged theory, even if it is used as an hypothesis in some models. 
 
12
 The martingale model had been introduced to model the random character of stock-market prices by 
Samuelson ( 1965 ) and Mandelbrot (1966). 
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martingale formalism was its explicit reference to a set of information.  13  As such, the 
martingale model could be used to test the implication of the effi cient markets theory 
that, if all available information is used, the expected profi t is nil. This idea led to the 
defi nition of an effi cient market that is generally used nowadays: “a market in which 
prices always ‘fully refl ect’ available information is called ‘effi cient’” (1970, p. 383). 
The part played by economics in the mathematical defi nition of the martingale model 
underlines economics’ key role in the creation of the structure of modern fi nancial 
theory. 
 The creation of new empirical data .  In parallel with the adoption of tools, models, and 
concepts from modern probability theory for analyzing fi nancial markets, another 
crucial advance occurred in the 1960s: the creation of databases containing long-term 
statistical data on the evolution of stock-market prices. These databases allowed 
spectacular development of empirical studies used to test models and theories in 
fi nance. The development of these studies was the result of the creation of new 
statistical data and the emergence of computers. 
 Beginning in the 1950s, computers gradually found their way into fi nancial institutions 
and universities (Sprowls  1963 , p. 91). However, owing to the costs of using them and 
their limited calculation capacity, “it was during the next two decades, starting in the 
early 1960s, as computers began to proliferate and programming languages and 
facilities became generally available, that economists more widely became users” 
(Renfro  2009 , p. 60). The fi rst econometric modeling languages began to be developed 
during the 1960s and the 1970s (Renfro  2004 , p. 147). From the 1960s on, computer 
programs began to appear in increasing numbers of undergraduate, master’s, and 
doctoral theses. As computers came into more widespread use, easily accessible 
databases were constituted, and stock-market data could be processed in an entirely 
new way, thanks to, among other things, fi nancial econometrics (Louçã  2007 ). Financial 
econometrics marked the start of a renewal of investigative studies on empirical data 
and the development of econometric tests. 
 A number of fi nancial-econometrics studies were carried out in the 1960s, using 
computers. While the fi rst empirical studies of this type date back to 1863 in France 
and the early 1930s in the US (Poitras  2006 , Jovanovic  2009b ), the results were very 
limited because all calculations had to be performed by hand. With computers, empirical 
study could become more systematic and be conducted on a larger scale. Attempts 
were made to test the random nature of stock-market variations in different ways 
(Jovanovic  2009b ). Markowitz’s hypotheses were used to develop specifi c computer 
programs to assist in making investment decisions.  14  
 Of the databases created during the 1960s, one of the most important was set up by 
the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago,  15  one of the key institutions 
 
13
 By defi nition, a martingale model,  1( ) 0t t tE P P+ Φ − =  ,  Φ  t, is a fi lter—that is, to use the terminology of 
fi nancial economics, a set of information that increases over time. 
 
14
 See, for instance, Cohen and Pogue ( 1967 ). 
 
15
 In 1960, two University of Chicago professors, James Lorie and Lawrence Fisher, started an ambitious 
four-year program of research on security prices. They created the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), which had an important group of PhD students such as Eugene Fama, Benjamin King, and Arnold 
Moore. Merton Miller joined them one year later, in 1961. 
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in the development of fi nancial economics. The fi rst version of this database, which 
collected monthly prices from January 1926 through December 1960, greatly facilitated 
the emergence of empirical studies. Apart from its exhaustiveness, it provided a history 
of stock-market prices and systematic updates. 
 The institutionalization of fi nancial economics and the challenge to the dominant school 
of thought of the time .  The third element that contributed to the institutional birth of 
fi nancial economics was the integration of the analysis framework of economics 
(hypotheses, concepts, method, etc.) into the analysis of fi nancial markets. This integration 
was the result of the formation in the early 1960s of a community of economists 
dedicated to the analysis of fi nancial markets. 
 Until the 1960s, fi nance in the United States was taught mainly in business schools. The 
textbooks used were very practical, and few of them touched on what became modern 
fi nancial theory. The research work that formed the basis of modern fi nancial theory was 
carried out by isolated writers who were trained in economics or were surrounded by 
economists, such as Working, Cowles, Kendal, Roy, and Markowitz. No university 
community devoted to the subject existed prior to the 1960s.  16  During the 1960s and 
1970s, training in American business schools changed radically, becoming more 
“rigorous.”  17  They began to “academicize” themselves, recruiting increasing numbers 
of economics professors who taught in university economics departments, such as 
Miller (Fama  2008 ). Similarly, prior to offering their own doctoral programs, business 
schools recruited doctorands who had been trained in university economics departments. 
 The recruitment of economists interested in questions of fi nance unsettled teaching 
and research as hitherto practiced in business schools and inside the American Finance 
Association. The new recruits brought with them their analysis frameworks, methods, 
hypotheses, and concepts, and also used the new mathematics that arose out of modern 
probability theory. These changes and their consequences were substantial enough for 
the American Finance Association to devote part of its annual meeting to them in two 
consecutive years, 1965 and 1966. 
 At the 1965 annual meeting of the American Finance Association, an entire session 
was devoted to the necessity to rethink courses in fi nance curricula. Paul Wendt 
discussed the development of fi nance and explained that “a modern concept of technical 
market analysis is emerging which emphasizes the application of newer analytical 
techniques and computer technology to test traditional and new theories of stock-price 
behaviour” (Wendt  1966 , pp. 421–422). At the 1966 annual meeting, the new president of 
the American Finance Association presented a paper on “The State of the Finance Field,” 
in which he talked of the changes being brought about by “the creators of the New Finance 
[who] become impatient with the slowness with which traditional materials and teaching 
techniques move along” (Weston  1967 , p. 539).  18  Although these changes elicited many 
 
16
 The new research path was not accepted by economists until the 1960s. Milton Friedman’s reaction to 
Harry Markowitz’s defense of his PhD thesis gives a good illustration. Friedman declared: “It’s not 
economics, it’s not mathematics, it’s not business administration,” and Jacob Marschak, who supervised 
Markowitz during his PhD, added: “It’s not literature” (Markowitz  2004 ). 
 
17
 See Mackenzie (2006, pp. 72–73), Whitley ( 1986a ,  1986b ), Fourcade and Khurana ( 2009 ), and Bernstein 
( 1992 ). 
 
18
 The same issues were raised in training sessions given by Financial Analysts Seminar, one of the leading 
professional organizations connected with fi nancial markets (Kennedy  1966 ). 
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debates (Whitley  1986a ,  1986b ; MacKenzie  2006 ; Poitras et al.  2007 ; Jovanovic  2008 ; 
Poitras et al.  2010 ), none succeeded in challenging the global movement. 
 The antecedents of these new actors were a determining factor in the institutionalization 
of modern fi nancial theory. Their background in economics allowed them to add 
theoretical content to the empirical results that had been accumulated since the 1930s 
and to the mathematical formalisms that had arisen from modern probability theory. 
In other words, economics brought the theoretical content that was missing. 
 The creation of a new scientifi c community requires that its new members share 
common tools, references, and problems. This was precisely the role of textbooks, 
seminars, and scientifi c journals. Those in fi nancial economics were developed from 
the beginning of the 1960s with the arrival of this new generation of professors and 
students. The two journals that had published articles in fi nance, the  Journal of Finance 
and the  Journal of Business , changed their editorial policy during the 1960s. Both 
started publishing articles based on modern probability theory and on modeling 
(Bernstein  1992 , pp. 41–44, 129). They also published several special issues to 
reinforce the new orientation and results. In 1966, the  Journal of Business published 
a special issue on “recent quantitative and formal research on the stock market.” In 
addition to these two journals, other scientifi c journals specializing in fi nancial 
economics were created, such as the  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis in 
1965. In 1968, the last-mentioned journal published a special issue on the application 
of the random walk model to stock prices. 
 It was also during the 1960s that textbooks and collections of articles started to 
appear.  19  These publications also helped defi ne and stabilize a culture shared by the 
members of the new community. Several seminars were also organized. The new 
seminars and the publications contributed to the creation of a truly homogenous 
community (which shared common problems, common tools, and a common language) 
and scientifi c journals and courses in universities. One of the main features of this 
common culture was the creation of a canonical history of fi nancial economics during 
the 1960s. This history was created to support theoretical viewpoints—viewpoints 
that led the mainstream community of scientists to recognize fi nancial economics as a 
science (Jovanovic  2008 ). 
 The Birth of Econophysics 
 Econophysics studies emerged in the 1990s. Their origins—like those of fi nancial 
economics—lay in modern probability theory, the emergence of new empirical data, 
and the use of models, hypotheses, and methods taken from a discipline outside the 
mainstream of the time. The birth of econophysics, therefore, closely resembles that of 
fi nancial economics in the 1960s. 
 The role of modern probability theory .  From the 1980s on, modern probability theory 
evolved to some degree, particularly with regard to the defi nition of stochastic 
processes known as “Lévy processes” (and, more precisely, as “stable Lévy processes”). 
Lévy processes include many classes of stochastic processes, such as the Wiener 
 
19
 For instance, Cootner ( 1964 ), Fredrikson (1965), Wu and Zakon ( 1965 ), Fredrikson ( 1971 ), and Lorie 
and Brealey ( 1972 ) published collections of articles, while Moore ( 1968 ), Mao ( 1969 ), Jean ( 1970 ), and 
Fama and Miller ( 1972 ) published textbooks. 
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process, jump-diffusion processes, and jump stable Lévy processes.  20  Jump stable 
Lévy processes are characterized by the existence of small jumps in alternation with 
big jumps; in general, they have infi nite variance. Due to their stable Lévy character, 
and unlike jump-diffusion models, jump stable Lévy models have infi nite activity 
(infi nite number of jumps on each time interval) and infi nite variation. A specifi c class 
of jump stable Lévy processes considered by econophysicists is composed of stable 
Lévy processes. 
 Stable Lévy processes are jump processes, characterized by the stable Lévy 
distribution, having an  α -stable law type  ( ) > = −αP X  x x  in which it is possible to 
observe constancy of the coeffi cient  α . A stable Lévy distribution with  α = 2 is a 
Gaussian distribution; with  α = 1, it is a Cauchy distribution; and with  α = 3/2, it is a 
Pareto distribution.  21  Stable Lévy processes have a distribution with infi nite variance, 
which is considered the main obstacle to the use of these processes in fi nance. Indeed, 
an infi nite variance means that risk can vary considerably, depending on the size of the 
sample and the observation scale. 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, stable Lévy processes were the subject of a theoretical 
debate in specialist literature on statistics. These processes were essentially seen as 
theoretical tools (Zolotarev  1986 ) or as “monsters” (MacKenzie  2006 , p. 108) with no 
real practical applications, due to their infi nite variance. This theoretical characteristic 
added considerably to the complexity of applying these processes to observed phe-
nomena, since the notion of variance very often refers to a well-defi ned empirical pa-
rameter, which is fi nite (risk in fi nance, temperature in thermodynamics, for example). 
Considering this situation, physicists developed theoretical solutions whose objective 
was to defi ne a class of processes that was compatible with the empirical observations 
they had. This theoretical literature led to the development of Lévy processes with 
fi nite variance, called “truncated Lévy processes” (Schinckus  2011b ). 
 From the 1980s onwards, stable Lévy processes were increasingly used in physics,  22  
particularly in statistical physics. The latter discipline can be thought of as the contin-
uation of thermodynamics, and the use of stable Lévy processes in this fi eld allowed 
more accurate modeling of the phenomenon of turbulence. The fi rst studies on Lévy 
processes applied to turbulence phenomena were those of Kolmogorov on the scale 
invariance of turbulence in the 1930s. This theme was subsequently addressed by 
many physicists and mathematicians, particularly by Mandelbrot in the 1960s when he 
defi ned fractal mathematics  23  and applied it to the phenomenon of turbulence. 
 
20
 A jump-diffusion process is a process generally compounded of a Wiener process (Brownian motion), 
characterized by the Gaussian distribution and another stochastic process (often a Poisson process). 
Overall, it is a Brownian motion with jumps at a specifi c rate dictated by the second process (Poisson 
process); the amplitudes of the jumps are characterized by Gaussian, exponential, or other kind of 
distributions. These compound processes have distribution with fi nite variance and a certain leptokurtic 
character. Also, the jump-diffusion processes have fi nite activity (fi nite number of jumps on each time 
interval) and fi nite variation. 
 
21
 For a statistical presentation of these specifi c laws, see Schoutens ( 2003 ). 
 
22
 See Frisch et al. ( 1994 ) for an analysis of the infl uence of Lévy processes in physics. 
 
23
 Although modern probability theory was properly created in the 1930s, in particular through the work of 
Kolmogorov, it was not until the 1950s that the Kolmogorov’s axioms became the mainstream in this 
discipline. 
ECONOPHYSICS: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMICS? 9
 Despite the extension of probability theory to thermodynamics, physicists did not 
seem disposed to integrate stable Lévy processes into physics (Gupta and Campanha 
 2002 , p. 382). The reason for this methodological position—which mirrors that taken 
in fi nancial economics—is that processes with infi nite variance were not physically 
plausible (i.e., compatible with assumptions of physics).  24  As Gupta and Campanha 
(1999, p. 232) point out, Lévy processes “have mathematical properties that discourage 
a physical approach because they have infi nite variance.”  25  The use of Lévy processes 
in physics necessitated the development of truncated Lévy processes, which allowed 
physicists to use these processes to statistically characterize turbulence phenomena 
without the problem of infi nite variance.  26  The fi rst truncated stable Lévy process in 
physics was proposed by Zolotarev in 1986. This response of physicists to the indeter-
minate nature of variance paved the way for fi nance applications to describe the 
evolution of fi nancial markets using stable Lévy processes that are not Gaussian. The fi rst 
application of this statistical solution to fi nance was proposed by Mantegna in 1991. 
 Truncated Lévy processes, then, provide an opportunity to solve the problem of 
infi nite variance observed in the application of Lévy processes in thermodynamics and 
fi nance. However, econophysicists use statistical processes in an instrumentalist 
manner. They are uninterested in hypotheses, preferring to focus on prediction. Of 
course, this kind of methodology is known in fi nance, where econometrics is often said 
to be based on the instrumentalist Friedmanian methodology (Angrist and Pischke 
 2008 ). However, unlike econometrics, econophysics is founded on a physically plausible 
analysis in which each statistical parameter must have a physical meaning. From this 
perspective, econophysicists have developed more sophisticated stable Lévy processes, 
giving them a statistical tool in line with a physically plausible framework (Schinckus 
 2011b ). 
 The creation of new empirical data .  In parallel with this application of stable Lévy 
processes to the study of fi nancial markets, new statistical data were created from the 
1990s as a result of the automation of fi nancial centers. 
 Since the 1970s, a number of fi nancial markets have been automated—Toronto, 
Paris, Nasdaq, and Euronext, for example. Today, electronic markets fl ood the fi nancial 
sphere with accurate data in real time. The automation of markets has made it possible 
to record “intraday” data. Previously, statistical data on fi nancial markets were generally 
made up of a single value per day (the average price). Today, by recording “intraday 
data,” all prices quoted are conserved. The new data collected in this manner have 
stimulated research into distributions of stock-market variations. It is diffi cult to determine 
laws of fi nancial data distribution with any certainty. Mitzenmacher ( 2004 ) reminds us 
 
24
 For example, temperature is assumed to be fi nite in physics, so to be physically plausible, a statistical 
process used in physics must generate a fi nite temperature. 
 
25
 In the view of physicists, this property of physical systems is the direct result of the thermodynamic 




 The truncation of Lévy distributions consists in normalizing them, using a particular function so that 
variance is fi nite. One can, for example, combine an untruncated Lévy process for the distribution center 
and explain the ends of tails using exponential distributions. On this subject, see Gupta and Campanha 
( 2002 ). 
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of how close these laws are to the so-called exponential laws, and that the two types of 
law can be distinguished only by means of a large volume of data. The advent of 
intraday data has made it possible to build suffi ciently broad samples to provide fi rm 
proof of Mandelbrot’s idea that the evolution of fi nancial markets could be characterized 
using stable Lévy processes such as those used by econophysicists (Kou  2008 ). 
 In this context, computer technology is presented as a tool that makes it possible to 
confi rm with certainty the hypothesis that the evolution of prices and returns on fi nancial 
markets can be characterized by a stable Lévy distribution. This growing quantifi cation 
of fi nancial information takes the form of an accumulation of data stored as temporal 
series, thereby making market fi nance “a natural area for physicists” (Gallegati, Keen , 
et al . 2006, p. 1). 
 Mantegna and Stanley (1999, p. 6), McCauley (2004, p. 7), and Burda, Jurkiewicz, 
and Nowak (2003, p. 3) also underline the role that computerization played in the 
emergence of econophysics, and above all the fact that it broadened the perspective 
of statistical market analysis. Now that fi nancial markets are computerized, tens of 
thousands of transactions or posted quotes in a single day—time-stamped to the nearest 
second—can be observed (Engle and Russell  2004 ). Analyzing these new data sets 
brings new challenges, and they require new statistical tools to characterize them. 
More precisely, several phenomena can be detected with intraday data that are not 
present with monthly or daily data. The latter are generally the last prices quoted 
during a month or a day, or a mean of the prices quoted during a period, and, therefore, 
jumps in data are generally smaller and less frequent. The computerization of fi nancial 
markets has, therefore, contributed to the use of new frameworks such as stable Lévy 
processes, which are better suited to the modeling of jumps in stock-price variations. 
 Computerization of fi nancial markets and, more generally, of the entire fi nancial 
sphere has had another consequence that has favored the use of stable Lévy processes 
with which physicists work. According to Barber and Odean ( 2001 ), the computerization 
of the fi nancial sphere provides an “illusion of knowledge” to online investors, who 
become excessively self-confi dent and tend to underestimate risks. This overconfi dence 
of investors leads them to invest more, and in a more speculative way, than they otherwise 
would.  27  Barber and Odean ( 2001 ) conclude that, in this way, online trading contributes 
to an increase in market volatility. This greater volatility has engendered more extreme 
variations in quotations (Jiang, Tang , et al . 2002), and, therefore, the tails of empirical 
distributions have become fatter. The normal law, used by almost all models in fi nancial 
economics, does not allow extreme variations to be taken into account.  28  Such variations 
are, however, perfectly integrated into stable Lévy processes. The increase in the 
volatility of fi nancial markets implying fatter tails of empirical distributions has, therefore, 
helped justify the use of statistical tools developed in physics that are suited to the 
analysis of extreme phenomena. 
 
27
 For instance, the development of options has increased the volatility (i.e., the price variations) of the 
underlying asset. Numerous studies on the effects of futures and options listing on the underlying cash-
market volatility have been done. For instance, Wei, Poon, and Zee ( 1997 ) report an increase in volatility 
for options on OTC stocks in the USA. 
 
28
 A device used by fi nancial economists is to combine a normal law and a Poisson law in order to repro-
duce jumps. 
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 We can see, therefore, a double contribution of technology to the emergence of 
econophysics: one is direct, resulting from the computerization of fi nancial markets 
(better analysis and storage of data); the other, more indirect, results from fi nancial 
behavior that computerization has engendered. 
 The institutionalization of econophysics .  In less than twenty years, econophysics has 
earned recognition as a scientifi c fi eld from academics of the hard sciences.  29  To gain 
this recognition, econophysicists adopted a variety of strategies for spreading their knowledge. 
Symposia were organized, several specialized journals created, and specifi c academic courses 
offered by physics departments to promote the scientifi c recognition and institutionalization 
of this new approach. All these strategies played a part not only in disseminating econo-
physics but also in creating a shared scientifi c culture (Nadeau  1995 ). 
 The fi rst publications date from the 1990s. The founding article by Stanley et al., 
published in 1996, strongly infl uenced physicists and mathematicians who, suddenly, 
developed a non-Gaussian approach to the study of fi nancial returns (Kutner and Grech 
 2008 ). Since 1996, sustained growth in the number of articles devoted to econophysics 
has been observed (Gingras et al . 2012). The increase in the number of articles 
published each year earned econophysics offi cial recognition as a subdiscipline of 
physical sciences in 2003—less than ten years after its birth. 
 The fi rst textbooks on econophysics were not far behind, the fi rst being published 
in 1999 by Mantegna and Stanley ( An Introduction to Econophysics). The process 
of institutionalization was reinforced in 2006 with the creation of the Society for 
Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents (ESHIA), whose objective 
is to promote an interdisciplinary research among economics, physics, and computer 
science (essentially artifi cial intelligence). This interdisciplinary project, supported by 
the creation of new journals,  30  is, therefore, aimed at the area covered by econophysics. 
 A further indicator of the emergence and the institutionalization of the new scientifi c 
community is the organization of symposia and workshops. The fi rst conference devoted 
to econophysics was organized in 1997 by the physics department of the University 
of Budapest. Today, conferences and symposia dedicated to econophysics are very 
numerous, notable among them being the Nikkei Econophysics Research Workshop 
and Symposium and Econophysics Colloquium. In addition to the numerous publications 
about econophysics, all these regular events constitute institutional spaces that are 
helping to make econophysics a true scientifi c community. 
 The last major element in the institutionalization of econophysics is university 
education. Today, the physics departments of the Universities of Fribourg (Switzerland), 
Ulm (Sweden), Münster (Germany), and Dublin (Ireland) offer courses in econophysics. 
Since 2002, the Universities of Warsaw and Wrolcaw (both in Poland) have been 
offering a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in econophysics, respectively (Kutner et al . 
2008). Finally, the University of Houston (Texas, USA) created the fi rst doctoral 
program in econophysics in 2006,  31  followed in 2009 by the University of Melbourne 
 
29
 The growing presence of econophysics in the pages of physics journals has probably contributed to the 
offi cial recognition of the fi eld by the Physics and Astrophysics Classifi cation Scheme (PACS): since 2003, 
econophysics has been an offi cial subcategory of physics under the code  89.65 Gh . For further information 
about the emergence of econophysics, see Jovanovic and Schinckus ( 2013 ). 
 
30
 The  Journal of Economic Interaction & Coordination, and also  Quantitative Finance . 
 
31
 Information on the program may be found at  http://phys.uh.edu/research/econophysics/index.php . 
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(Australia).  32  All these programs are offered by physics departments, and courses are 
essentially oriented toward statistical physics and condensed-matter physics. 
 Similarities between the Emergence of Both Disciplines 
 This section underlines the similarities between the emergence of mainstream fi nan-
cial economics and the emergence of econophysics. The similarities suggest that 
econophysics is, in some respects, a continuation of fi nancial economics. 
 The Role of Probability Theory and Empirical Data 
 As we saw in the fi rst part, two elements strongly contributed to the emergence of both 
approaches: the development of modern probability theory, on the one hand; and the 
evolution of fi nancial markets, which are increasingly quantitative (or digitized), on 
the other. In each case, these two factors acted as triggers for the emergence of an 
alternative approach. Let us now look more closely at this point. 
 In the 1960s, as explained earlier, some economists took up random processes 
at a time when mathematical developments had become newly accessible to non-
mathematicians. The use or non-use of these new tools—modern probability theory 
and work on statistical data—constituted the main element setting the “new approach” 
against the “traditional approach” of the time: “Mathematical models, careful statistical 
testing of hypotheses, decision theory, the techniques of operations research, and the 
new and powerful tool of programming began to be applied to the fi nance fi eld” 
(Weston  1967 , p. 539). 
 This mathematical eolution went hand in hand with technological developments as 
the use of computers gradually became widespread. Computers made it possible to 
perform tests on empirical data (in this case, econometric tests) in order to assess the 
methods proposed for earning money on fi nancial markets, particularly chartist 
analysis. In this respect, Rosenfeld (1957, p. 52) proved to be visionary when he 
suggested using computers for testing theories on a large sample. 
 The development of probability theory combined with fi ner quantifi cation of 
fi nancial markets (thanks to developments in computing) were triggering factors in the 
emergence of econophysics, also. As explained earlier, physicists refi ned Lévy laws in 
order to use them in physics. In particular, they developed what are known as truncated 
Lévy laws, which have fi nite variance. In this perspective, truncated Lévy laws are to 
econophysics what the Gaussian framework was to mainstream fi nancial economics  33  : 
statistical justifi cation of its approach and, hence, a justifi cation of its emergence. 
 Once again, in the case of econophysics, computers—again in parallel with 
mathematical developments—contributed to the emergence of the new approach, 
because they made possible better quantifi cation of fi nancial operations. Today, 
electronic markets rule the fi nancial sphere, and allow more accurate study of the 
evolution of the real-time data they provide (stored in the form of time series). While 






 The Gaussian framework gave birth to the fi rst studies in fi nancial economics (Jovanovic and Schinckus 
 2010 ). 
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markets has enabled intraday data providing “three orders of magnitude more data” to 
be recorded (Stanley, Amaral , et al. 2000, p. 339). The quantity of data is an important 
factor at a statistical level because the larger the sample, the more reliable the identifi cation 
of statistical patterns. 
 Computerization of fi nancial centers has led to the recording of huge quantities of 
fi nancial data, so much so that econophysicists see fi nance as truly an “empirical 
(rather than axiomatic) science” (Bouchaud  2002 ). The creation of empirical databases 
had played the same role in the 1960s: they stimulated the application of mathematical 
models taken from modern probability theory and research into stock-market 
variations. 
 Thus, both fi nancial economics and econophysics owe their emergence to the creation 
of new mathematics combined with the creation of new statistical data. Morgan and 
Morrison ( 1999 ) underlined the importance of models in twentieth-century scientifi c 
disciplines, particularly economics. Models have shown themselves to be “mediators” 
between theory and reality. In other words, they are neither one nor the other: “It is 
precisely because models are partially independent of both theories and world that 
they have this autonomous component and so can be used as instruments of exploration 
in both domains” (1999, p. 10). Analyses by Cartwright ( 1983 ), and Barberousse and 
Ludwig ( 2000 ), have shown that, in twentieth-century scientifi c disciplines at least, 
scientifi c models must be interpreted as  fi ction s. Although both fi nancial economics 
and econophysics owe their emergence to mathematical modeling, they must be 
distinguished from one another as regards the place occupied by theory: in the case of 
econophysics, there is currently no theoretical explanation to give meaning to the 
models used.  34  
 The Same Institutionalization Strategy 
 As regards institutionalization, econophysics is once again following the pattern 
observed during the emergence of fi nancial economics: in both cases, a recognized 
discipline expanded towards a new fi eld of research whose study had been hitherto 
dominated by another discipline. In the 1960s, economics expanded to the study of 
fi nancial markets, which, at the time, was dominated by so-called “traditional” fi nancial 
theory; in the 1990s, statistical physics expanded to the study of fi nancial markets, 
which, at the time, were dominated by fi nancial economics. In both cases, the new 
community was made up of scientists trained outside the discipline, and, hence, outside 
the mainstream. A kind of colonization of fi nance has occurred. 
 This colonization can also be detected in the new arrivals’ publication strategy. 
They began by publishing in journals of their discipline of origin to make themselves 
known and disseminate their results—a sort of takeover of recognized scientifi c journals 
in the discipline of origin. 
 In the 1960s, the newcomers took control of the two main journals specializing in 
fi nance at the time, the  Journal of Business and the  Journal of Finance . The aim was 
to modify the content of published articles by imposing a more strongly mathematical 
content and by using a particular structure: presenting the mathematical model and 
 
34
 This is one of the reasons why we describe econophysics as a scientifi c fi eld and fi nancial economics as 
a scientifi c discipline. 
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then empirical tests. To reinforce the new orientation, these two journals also pub-
lished several special issues. Once control over these journals had been established, 
the newcomers developed their own journals, such as the  Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis created in 1965. 
 Similarly, econophysicists chose to publish and gain acceptance in journals devoted 
to an existing theoretical fi eld in physics (statistical physics) rather than create new 
journals outside an existing scientifi c space and, hence, structure. These journals are 
among the most prestigious in physics. This editorial strategy is a result not only of the 
methodology used by econophysicists (deriving from statistical physics) but also of 
this new community’s hope to gain recognition from the existing scientifi c community 
quickly, on the one hand, and to reach a larger audience, on the other hand. Then they 
took control of editorial boards (as in the case of  Physica A and  The European Journal 
of Physics B ). 
 The new approaches had no alternative to this “colonization strategy,” because 
partisans of the dominant approach (and, hence, of the so-called mainstream journals) 
rejected these new theoretical developments in which they were not yet profi cient. 
Gradual recognition of the new discipline subsequently allowed new specialist journals 
to be created, such as the  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (1965), 
 Quantitative Finance (2001), and the  Journal of Economic Interaction & Coordination 
(2006), which are offi cially indexed under human sciences, making it possible to reach 
a wider readership (especially in economics). 
 Similar Claims regarding the Discipline’s Scientifi city 
 A fi nal similarity is the use of the same discourse to justify the scientifi city of the 
new approach. The emergence of both fi nancial economics and econophysics was 
accompanied by particularly virulent criticism of the scientifi city of existing studies. 
An analysis of the discourse used reveals three similar justifi cations: the claim of a 
more scientifi c approach, breaking with the past; belittling of the existing approach; 
and the claim of greater empirical realism. 
 The claim of a more scientifi c approach .  In each case, proponents of the new approach 
challenged the traditional approach by asking its adepts to prove that it was scientifi c. This 
“confrontational” attitude is founded upon the challengers’ contention that the empirical 
studies, the new mathematics, and methodology they use guarantee a scientifi city (i.e., 
a way of doing science) absent from the traditional approach.  35  The challengers maintain 
that the scientifi city of a theory or a model should determine whether it is adopted or 
rejected. 
 This confrontational approach was used by the early fi nancial economists in their 
opposition to the chartists and to fi nancial analysts.  36  As an example, James Lorie 
(Lorie  1965 , p. 17) taxed the chartists with not taking into account the tools used in a 
scientifi c discipline such as economics. Similarly, Fama (Fama  1965c , p. 59), Fisher 
and Lorie (1964, pp. 1–2), and Archer (1968, pp. 231–232) presented their results as a 
“challenge” to chartists and fi nancial analysts. In this debate, fi nancial economists 
argued that their approach was based on scientifi c criteria, while chartism was based 
 
35
 See, for instance, Lorie (1966, p. 107). 
 
36
 These two tendencies represented the traditional approach at the time. 
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on folklore and had no scientifi c foundation. Consequently, fi nancial economics should 
supplant previous folkloric practices. 
 Another argument is based on the method used. Consider Fama’s three articles 
(Fama  1965b ,  1965c ,  1970 ). All used the same structure: the fi rst part dealt with theo-
retical implications of the random walk model and its links with the effi cient market 
hypothesis, while the second part presented empirical results that validate the random 
walk model. This sequence—theory then empirical results—is today very familiar. It 
constitutes the hypothetico-deductive method, the scientifi c method defended in eco-
nomics since the middle of the twentieth century. 
 As with fi nancial economics in the 1960s, the main epistemological justifi cation for 
the emergence of econophysics was the idea that the new approach was more scientifi c 
than the old. Econophysicists claim that their approach is more neutral (i.e., not based 
on an  a priori model) with regard to the study of chance. They explicitly demonstrate 
a willingness to develop models that are, on the one hand, more coherent from a 
physics point of view,  37  and, on the other hand, based on “raw” observations of 
economic systems (Stanley, Gabaix , et al. 2008). This approach is deemed more robust 
and more scientifi c than the empirical studies carried out in fi nancial economics 
(Stanley et al.  2008 , p. 3),  38  and, in addition, “a claim often made by econophysicists 
is that their models are more realistic than those offered up by economists and econo-
metricians” (Stanley et al.  2008 , p. 3).  39  By “physically realistic models,” the authors 
mean that econophysicists need to be able to give a physical meaning to the statistical 
parameters they use.  40  
 Bouchaud (2002, p. 238) 41 and McCauley (2004, p. 7) further assert their position 
by implying that physicists are the class of scientists best placed to deal with economic 
and fi nancial phenomena. 
 Belittling the existing approach .  Justifying the emergence of a new approach involves 
systematically calling into question the methodology employed by the mainstream and 
using a specifi c vocabulary to denigrate its work. 
 
37
 That is, that accord with the theoretical principles of modeling in statistical physics—the fact, for 
example, that in the analysis of stationary physical systems, variance must always be fi nite, in accordance 
with the thermodynamic hypotheses (concerning the concept of heat). See Gupta and Campanha ( 1999 ). 
 
38
 In whatever econophysicists write, they seem to be infl uenced by an empiricist epistemology that can 
also be seen as an implicit  a priori about the world, directly inspired by a neo-positivist methodology 
(Schinckus  2010b ). 
 
39
 Stylized facts are the simplifi ed presentation of an empirical fi nding. They often take the form of a gen-
eralization of some complicated statistical calculations, which, although essentially true, may have inac-
curacies in the detail. 
 
40
 The fi rst reason, as we mentioned above, is the infi nite characteristics of variance, which is not physically 
plausible because the second moment is often related to the system temperature, so infi nite variance would 
imply an infi nite temperature. The second reason why physicists rejected stable Lévy processes in physics 
is that these processes are based on an asymptotical argument. To characterize turbulence phenomena 
using stable Lévy processes, physicists had then to solve these two theoretical problems in order to fi t the 
statistical tools to the reality they study: on the one hand, they look for a fi nite variance; and, on the other 
hand, they want to work in a (locally) non-asymptotical framework. In this perspective, they developed 
stable Lévy processes. See Schinckus ( 2011a ) for further information. 
 
41
 According to Bouchaud (2002, p. 238), fi nance has become an “empirical (rather than axiomatic) 
science.... This means that any statistical model, or theoretical idea, can and must be tested against 
available data, as physicists are (probably better than other communities) trained to do.” 
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 Cootner’s book (1964) was one of the fi rst publications used by the proponents of 
fi nancial economics to defi ne the discipline. In his introduction, Cootner asserted that:
 Academic studies have proven to be more sceptical about the folklore of the market 
place than those of the professional practitioners. To several of the authors represented in 
this volume the ‘patterns’ described by some market analysis are mere superstitions. 
(Cootner  1964 , p. 1) 
 Cootner ( 1964 ) presented the fi rst studies of the fi nancial economists he discussed as 
the fi rst scientifi c approach to stock-market variations, which would supplant previous 
practices, judged to be groundless. The method employed and the empirical test of 
hypotheses were also presented as a guarantee of the scientifi city of the results. 
 Fama (1965c, p. 59) and Lorie (1966, p. 110), other emblematic fi gures in fi nancial 
economics, denigrated traditional approaches in a similar manner. Hoffl and (1967, pp. 
85–88) provided a good summary of the situation:
 Folklore is a body of knowledge incorporating the superstitions, beliefs and practices 
of the unsophisticated portion of a society…. Folklore is distinguished from scientifi c 
knowledge by its lack of rigor…. The Dow Theory is often used as an example of a 
crudely formulated stock market ‘theory’…. 
 Econophysicists have proceeded in like fashion. In their work, they belittle the 
methodological framework of fi nancial economics using similar vocabulary. They 
describe the theoretical developments of fi nancial economics as “inconsistent … and 
appalling” (Stanley et al.  1999 , p. 288). Despite his being an economist,  42  Keen (2003, 
p. 109) discredits fi nancial economics by highlighting the “superfi cially appealing” 
character of its key concepts or by comparing it to any “tapestry of beliefs” (Keen 
 2003 , p. 108). Marsili and Zhang (1998, p. 51) describe fi nancial economics as “anti-
empirical,” while McCauley does not shrink from comparing the scientifi c value of the 
models of fi nancial economics to that of cartoons: “The multitude of graphs presented 
without error bars in current economics texts are not better than cartoons, because they are 
not based on real empirical data, only on falsifi ed neo-classical expectations” (2006, p. 17). 
 The vocabulary used is designed to leave the reader in no doubt: “scientifi c,” “folklore,” 
“deplorable,” “superfi cial,” “sceptical,” “superstition,” “mystic,” “challenge.” 
 The claim of greater empirical realism .  Financial economists underlined the importance 
of the empirical dimension of their research from their very fi rst publications (Lorie  1965 , 
p. 3). They saw the testability of their models and theories as a guarantee of scientifi city, 
and concluded that “The empirical evidence to date provides strong support for the random-
walk model” (Fama  1965c , p. 59). 
 The same has happened in the case of the econophysicists, some of whom have 
insisted that it is precisely because the fundamental concepts of fi nancial economics 
are “empirically and logically” (Keen  2003 , p. 108) erroneous that a new, more “realistic” 
form of modeling needs to be developed. Here, the term “realistic” must be understood, 
according to econophysicists, to mean true relationship; that is, the ability to describe 
 
42
 With Rosser ( 2006 ,  2008a ), Keen is one of the rare breed of economists who have engaged the 
econophysicists. 
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the true relationship governing changes in fi nancial quotations.  43  This realism is, 
therefore, essentially  a posteriori and in no way directed at the nature of hypotheses 
formulated  ex ante (unlike economics, for example). This relationship to empiricism is 
very marked in econophysicists, who regularly point out that the empirical dimension 
is central in their work. Thus, although the “empirical data” are the same for fi nancial 
economists and for physicists (fi nancial quotations in the form of temporal series), 
physicists are quick to point to their “direct use of raw data,” thereby criticizing the use 
of statistical transformations performed by fi nancial economists to “normalize” data. 
Here is Mandelbrot on this point:
 The Gaussian framework being a statistician’s best friend, often, when he must 
process data that are obviously not normal, he begins by “normalizing” them … in the 
same way, it has been very seriously suggested to me that I normalize price changes. 
I believe, quite to the contrary, that the long tails of histograms of price changes 
contain considerable amounts of information, and that there are a number of cogent 
reasons for tackling them head-on. (1997, p. 142) 
 McCauley directly attacks this practice used by fi nancial economists, explaining,
 We [econophysicists] have no mathematical model in mind  a priori . We do not 
‘massage’ the data. Data massaging is both dangerous and misleading.... Economists 
assume a preconceived model with several unknown parameters and then try to force-fi t 
the model to a nonstationary time series by a ‘best choice of parameters.’ (2006, p. 8) 
 This methodological position is widespread among econophysicists, who work in 
the spirit of experimental physics in contrast to standard methods in economics. This 
empirical perspective is also justifi ed, in the view of econophysicists, by the evolution of 
fi nancial reality. The computerization of fi nancial markets has led to better quantifi cation 
of fi nancial reality, which should now be studied as an “empirical science” (Bouchaud 
 2002 , McCauley  2004 ). This radical viewpoint espoused by some econophysicists has 
an element of naivety. Indeed, in a sense, any sampling method is a massaging of data. 
Nevertheless, this viewpoint has led econophysicists to a better consideration of 
extreme values, while such values are considered as errors by the majority of fi nancial 
economists.  44  However, econophysicists seem to forget that all statistical data are 
embedded in a theory. By developing only physically plausible frameworks, econo-
physicists also appear to have some  a priori beliefs about the world. Indeed, for econo-
physicists, there are no “abnormal data,” but only data about reality. From this point of 
view, whatever econophysicists write, their empiricist methodology can also be seen 
 
43
 Although they are mainly focused on instrumental prediction, econophysicists often claim they deal with 
essential relationships existing in fi nancial phenomena (McCauley  2004 ). 
 
44
 The way the CRSP database was created provides a good example of apriorism from fi nancial econo-
mists: “Rather than coding and punching all prices twice and then resolving discrepancies manually, we 
found a better procedure. We know that the change in the price of a stock during one month is very nearly 
independent of its change during the next month. Therefore, if a price changes a large amount from one 
date to a second date, and by a similar amount in the opposite direction from the second date to a third, 
there is a reason to believe that at the second date the price was misrecorded. A ‘large change’ was rather 
arbitrarily taken to mean a change in magnitude of more than 10 per cent of the previous price plus a 
dollar” (Lorie  1965 , p. 7). 
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as an implicit  a priori assumption about the world directly inspired by a neo-positivist 
epistemology (Schinckus  2010b ,  2011b ). In a sense, no way of collecting data can ever 
be totally neutral, because all data are necessarily the result of a specifi c process 
(Schinckus  2010a ). 
 III.  COULD ECONOPHYSICS DOMINATE TOMORROW’S FINANCIAL 
THEORY? 
 Our fi rst part has shown that the creation of econophysics followed the same path as 
the creation of fi nancial economics, which subsequently came to dominate fi nancial 
theory. Furthermore, fi nancial economists in the 1960s and econophysicists in the 
1990s and 2000s justifi ed the emergence of their approach using the same arguments. 
The fact remains that fi nancial economics is today a well-established scientifi c discipline, 
particularly thanks to its links with economics. Econophysics, on the other hand, still 
occupies a marginal position in modern fi nancial theory. However, the similarity in the 
emergence of these two theoretical approaches raises the question of whether econo-
physics could emerge as the dominant approach in fi nance, just as fi nancial economics 
did several decades earlier. 
 Our point is not to suggest that history repeats itself, but that the way a dominant 
approach is created leads to the establishment of specifi c relations with theories, 
models, and hypotheses (for instance, the discrepancies that will be considered as 
anomalies). More precisely, defenders of an established approach cannot be indifferent 
to the emergence of a new community that follows the same path to fi ght for its place 
in the scientifi c community. This second part analyzes this question in detail, examining 
the strengths and weaknesses of econophysics in its struggle to challenge fi nancial 
economics. 
 Strengths that Could Help Econophysics Supplant the Mainstream Approach 
 Econophysics has two main strengths to help it become dominant: it explains empirical 
facts that are not explained by today’s mainstream fi nancial economics; and it uses a 
mathematical framework that represents a continuation of the models used by fi nancial 
economists, but is more general. These two elements are crucial to the question we are 
examining, because of the role they played in the emergence of both these scientifi c 
approaches. 
 Better Prediction of Empirical Facts 
 Econophysics’ fi rst strong point is its ability to explain empirical facts for which fi nancial 
economics fails to account. As the work of Kuhn ( 1962 ) showed, the emergence of a 
new approach can be justifi ed by its ability to provide answers to the anomalies of 
the established approach.  45  In order for a new approach to establish itself as the new 
reference point for a discipline, it must not only generalize the existing results of the 
 
45
 We use the term “anomalies” here to qualify the difference between empirical observations and theoretical 
predictions. 
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old approach but must also better explain observed empirical facts (including those not 
explained by the old approach). 
 This question is deeply embedded in the history of fi nancial economics. Indeed, the 
emergence of new empirical data and new statistical and mathematical models has 
regularly led fi nancial economists to transform discrepancies between predictions and 
observations into anomalies. As we have seen, before the 1960s, statistical records of 
stock prices were monthly data; the CRSP then began collecting daily data. This 
changed the manner in which observations were treated. In 1978, just a few years after 
mainstream fi nancial economics created the effi cient-market hypothesis, Jensen 
pointed out that
 in a manner remarkably similar to that described by Thomas Kuhn in his book,  The 
Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions , we seem to be entering a stage where widely scat-
tered and as yet incohesive evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent with the 
theory. As better data become available (e.g., daily stock-price data) and as our econo-
metric sophistication increases, we are beginning to fi nd inconsistencies that our 
cruder data and techniques missed in the past. It is evidence which we will not be able 
to ignore. (Jensen  1978 , p. 95). 
 Econophysics emerged in the wake of similar developments: the creation of new 
data (intraday data) and the new mathematical tools (truncated Lévy processes in 
particular) allowed more accurate observation and then transformed several discrep-
ancies into anomalies. Consequently, econophysicists highlight the existence of a 
number of empirical facts that are not explained by mainstream fi nancial economics 
and constitute anomalies. In view of the fact that prices on fi nancial markets change 
more frequently and in a more orderly manner than is supposed by the Gaussian frame-
work on which fi nancial economics was established, econophysicists use  α -stable 
Lévy processes directly to describe the evolution of fi nancial data. Because econo-
physicists had their own theoretical goals (making Lévy processes compatible with a 
physically plausible approach), they developed a statistical framework outside the 
traditional approach. Doing so allows them to address a number of empirical facts that 
the traditional approach of fi nancial economists cannot explain because it uses a 
Gaussian framework.  46  
 The main empirical facts to which econophysics proposes answers where fi nancial 
economics is unable to are “fat tails,” “volatility persistence,” and “volatility clustering.” 
 In the 1960s, during the creation of mainstream fi nancial economics, Mandelbrot 
( 1963 , 1965) and Fama ( 1965a ) drew attention to the high number of extreme events 
in fi nance and, hence, to the leptokurticity of empirical distributions, which have fat 
tails. At the time, these authors proposed describing empirical distributions with stable 
Lévy processes. The distributions associated with stable Lévy processes are approxi-
mately bell-shaped but they assign greater (than Gaussian) probability to events in the 
center and at the ends of the tails. However, in 1965, Fama (1965a, p. 416) pointed 
out that the infi nite variance of stable Lévy processes is meaningless in fi nancial 
economics, since this statistical parameter is associated with the concept of risk, and 
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 Jovanovic and Schinckus ( 2013 ) explain that the Gaussian approach has played a key role in the 
construction of the mainstream, and, until now, stable Lévy processes have not allowed such results. 
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deplored the fact that no computational defi nition yet existed for evaluating this 
parameter. Financial economists did not have the statistical tools that would allow 
them to describe empirical distributions with a stable Lévy framework. Another reason 
why fat tails had not been studied lies in the diffi culty of clearly identifying statistical 
processes with weekly or daily data (Mitzenmacher  2004 ). In this respect, the avail-
ability of intraday data since the 1990s has favored the identifi cation of stable Lévy 
processes and has subsequently stimulated research into these processes. Since the 
1990s, new statistical tools have been developed with the aim of creating stable Lévy 
processes with fi nite variance. Econophysical works are directly in line with these new 
statistical tools. 
 The second main empirical fact to which econophysics proposes answers is 
volatility persistence.  47  In the 1970s, when fi nancial economists created their theoretical 
framework, they did not have the econometrical tools that could help authors to 
identify a persistence of volatility. According to this framework, which is based on the 
Gaussian distribution, there is no memory between stock-market returns. Starting from 
the 1980s, econometrical tools have been proposed, with the development of 
ARCH family models (Engle  1982 ) demonstrating that volatility has slowly decaying 
autocorrelations showing a dependency between stock-market returns. Later, Schwert 
(1989) showed this persistence of volatility in a different statistical context. 
 The last main empirical fact is volatility clustering.  48  In a Gaussian framework, one 
could expect to see a very uniform time distribution of large and small fl uctuations. In 
1981, an original use of a martingale model led Shiller to observe several periods of 
large fl uctuations and periods of small fl uctuations that are not consistent with the 
Gaussian framework. In other words, periods of intense fl uctuations and low fl uctuations 
tend to cluster together (Shiller  1981b ,  1981a ). Shiller’s works generated much debate 
and favored the emergence of new fi elds calling neoclassical fi nance into question—
behavioral fi nance, for example (Schinckus  2009 ). Econophysicists’ tools make it 
possible to put forward answers to this empirical fact. 
 To answer these anomalies, econophysicists base their analysis on Lévy processes 
that are better adapted to the empirical data available today. Lévy’s  α -stable regimes 
are processes whose accretions are independent and stationary,  49  and follow an  α -stable 
law type { }Pr X > x = x α  in which it is possible to observe constancy of the parameter  α . 
In their Paretian form, these regimes have  α < 2, and in these cases, it can be shown that 
variance is infi nite.  50  As Belkacem (1996, p. 40) emphasized, “from a practical point of 
view, stable distributions are able to explain the thick distribution tails observed in 
empirical distributions of asset profi tability rates.” A similar argument is found in the 
writings of Tankov (2004, p. 13), who added that these processes are particularly inter-
esting in fi nancial economics because they allow discontinuities in the evolution of asset 
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 Clegg ( 2006 ) discusses the integration of this empirical fact by econophysics in greater detail. 
 
48




 The “stationary” character means that the process causing price variations remains the same over time, 
but it would be erroneous to associate this stationary character with continuity of the process. This is what 
Mandelbrot pointed out (1997, p. 138) in discussing this link between discontinuity and stationariness. 
 
50
 For  α < 1, the variance but also the mean are also theoretically infi nite (or undefi ned). 
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returns to be taken into account. This means that these processes are candidates for 
explaining the leptokurticity of fi nancial data. 
 The analysis of these empirical facts proposed by econophysicists is essentially 
empirical itself, and points to econophysics’ predictive capacity. Above all, the solutions 
allow a better statistical understanding of the phenomenon of fi nancial data variability. 
As pointed out by Shiller ( 1981b ), this phenomenon has been underestimated by 
neoclassical fi nance’s theoretical framework. 
 The integration of empirical facts unexplained by fi nancial economics into the 
(more generalized) theoretical framework developed by econophysicists is, thus, an 
argument in favor of a shift in mainstream fi nancial theory. 
 A More General and More Complete Probabilistic Framework 
 Econophysics’ second strong point in its bid to become the dominant approach is the 
use of statistical models that generalize those used in fi nancial economics. 
 Financial economists mainly use the Gaussian framework in order to characterize 
fi nancial uncertainty. Four reasons can be cited to explain the success of the Gaussian 
framework: the historical development of fi nancial economics (Jovanovic  2008 , 
Jovanovic et al.  2013 ),  51  simplicity (only two parameters are needed to describe data), 
the notion of normality (which can refer to the key concept of economic equilibrium), 
and, above all, statistical justifi cation, which refers to one of the most fundamental 







 of  n stochastic variables  x that are statistically independent, identically distributed,  53  
and with a fi nite variance converges when  n → ∞ to a Gaussian stochastic process 
(Feller  1971 ). 
 For econophysicists, the Gaussian framework is the fi rst step towards describing 
uncertainty in science. This fi rst step can be generalized to a savage uncertainty “without 
normality” (Mandelbrot 1997, p. 66). This generalization is based, on one hand, on 
Lévy’s work (1924) on random processes, and, on the other hand, on the generalized 
central-limit theorem developed by Gnedenko and Kolmogorov ( 1954 ). In accordance 
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 Jules Regnault, in 1863, was directly infl uenced by Adolphe Quételet’s work on the application of normal 
distribution to social phenomena (Jovanovic  2001 ,  2006 ). Bachelier ( 1900 ), whose work was clearly infl u-
enced by Regnault’s (Jovanovic  2000 ,  2009b ,  2012 ), retained a Gaussian description of the evolution of 
variation in the price of assets for demonstrating the equivalence between the results obtained in discrete 
time and in continuous time. Similarly, all the empirical work that emerged from the 1930s onward (Cowles 
 1933 , Working  1934 , Cowles and Jones  1937 , Kendall 1953) used this Gaussian framework because at the 
time it was impossible to use other kinds of statistical distribution. Indeed, all non-Gaussian observations 
and “white noise” were characterized through a Gaussian standardization. 
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 The fi rst fundamental theorem is The Law of Large Numbers (Tijms 2004). 
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 A generalization of the theorem for variables that are not identically distributed (but always with a fi nite 
variance) was developed by Gnedenko and Kolmogorov ( 1954 ). 
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with this generalization, the sum of random variables following Lévy laws, distributed 
independently and identically, converge towards the stable Lévy law having the same 
parameters. This generalization of the central-limit theorem justifi es and provides a 
statistical foundation for the use of Lévy laws to characterize complex phenomena.  54  
Lévy’s work proposed a generalization of several known distribution laws in the form 
of a family of random variable distributions notated as  α β μ γ,S ( , ) .  55  By basing their 
approach on Lévy processes, econophysicists propose models that encompass all 
stochastic processes, such as Gaussian processes and Poisson processes. 
 By making use of stable Lévy processes, econophysics offers a more general 
theoretical framework than fi nancial economics, which uses Gaussian distribution.  56  
From this perspective, the models of fi nancial economics are merely particular cases,  57  
and the statistical tools used by econophysicists make possible technical integration of 
the Gaussian statistical framework on which mainstream fi nancial economics is based. 
As a generalization of the Gaussian framework, the  α -stable framework retains the 
fundamental properties (fractality and auto-affi nity) of the Gaussian framework. There 
is, thus, mathematical continuity in the models used by fi nancial economists and those 
used by econophysicists. This continuity had been advanced in the 1960s by Mandelbrot 
and Fama at the very beginning of the creation of mainstream fi nancial economics. 
This attempt was not developed because of the theoretical meaninglessness of the 
hypothesis of infi nite variance. Several paths have been explored by fi nancial economists 
since the 1970s but none dropped the Gaussian framework (Jovanovic et al.  2013 ).  58  
Today, the evolution of mathematics developed by econophysicists allows the develop-
ment of a Markowitz portfolio theory, a generalized CAPM in an  α -stable framework 
(Belkacem  1996 , Tankov  2004 ), and the development of a Black and Scholes option-
pricing model in an  α -stable framework (Huang and Wu  2004 ). Such a characteristic 
would also make it possible to preserve the concept of market effi ciency, even if new 
risk-analysis parameters were to be introduced. As Fama pointed out (Fama  1965c ), 
the concept of effi ciency did not necessarily imply the Gaussianity of accretions. 
 The generalization used today by econophysicists is, thus, a strong point. Moreover, 
it renders the fi rst attempts of fi nancial economists such as Fama ( 1963 ) and Mandelbrot 
(1965) viable. These fi rst attempts have been enhanced by the purely mathematical 
framework developed by Harrison and Pliska ( 1981 ). Indeed, by proposing a non-
economic model in fi nance, Harrison and Pliska provided an entry point for an evolution 
of modern fi nance less based on economics. As a result, from a mathematical viewpoint, 
the models developed by econophysicists continue from where those developed by 
fi nancial economists left off. The challenge for the future of econophysics will be to 
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 The central-limit theorem, according to historians of statistics, provided the main argument for the use of 
the Gaussian framework for the study of varied phenomena. 
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 As Schoutens ( 2003 ) makes clear, the family of  α -stable distributions identifi ed by Lévy appears to be the 
general form of a number of statistical laws known as the normal law  μ γ2,0S ( , ) , Cauchy’s law  μ γ1,0S ( , ) , 
Pareto’s law  β μ γ3/2,S ( , ) , and Lévy’s law  μ γ11/2,S ( , ) . 
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 To allow comparison of the various models developed by econophysicists, Bucsa, Jovanovic, and 
Schinckus ( 2010 ) propose a generalized formula that can be used to unify the work of these research fi elds. 
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 Economists and fi nanciers have long been interested in the leptokurtic nature of price distributions. See 
Louçã (2007, p. 219), Jovanovic ( 2009b ), and Jovanovic et al. ( 2013 ). 
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 For instance, Merton’s ( 1976 ) model on jump processes. 
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show that the models proposed by econophysicists can be integrated into this mathe-
matical framework developed by Harrison and Pliska.  59  
 Limitations Hindering Econophysics from Becoming the Dominant Approach in 
Finance 
 As we have explained, econophysics was born outside fi nancial economics, and it is 
today achieving institutional status with its own prestigious, intellectual actors, awards, 
journals, conferences, academic programs, and departments. This last section explains 
that in spite of all this, the results, models, and hypotheses of econophysics have so far 
failed to break into the mainstream of fi nancial economics, even if, since the 1990s, 
fi nancial economists have progressively begun to publish papers related to Lévy 
processes.  60  
 Indeed, although econophysics has undeniable advantages to help it establish itself 
as the new dominant approach in fi nance, two major limitations work against this 
eventuality: fi rst, the virtual absence of discussion between fi nancial economists and 
econophysicists; and, second, econophysicists’ non-use of fi nancial economics and 
mathematical-fi nance hypotheses. 
 The Virtual Absence of Discussion between Financial Economists and Econophysicists 
 Although econophysicists explicitly position themselves in relation to fi nancial 
economics, it has to be noted that the response of economists to their criticisms has 
been, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. Some economists have pointed out the 
limitations of the econophysics approach (Gallegati et al.  2006 ),  61  provoking a virulent 
response from one of the leading lights of econophysics (McCauley  2006 ). Aside from 
this brief exchange of communication, real theoretical debate between econophysicists 
and economists has so far seemed diffi cult. The sometimes severe criticisms made 
by econophysicists of the models and hypotheses used in fi nancial economics have 
apparently failed to convince economists of the need to engage in theoretical discus-
sions. One feature in particular explains the problem: econophysics’ framework is not 
directly compatible with that of fi nancial economics, and econophysicists do not take 
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 As we mentioned earlier, none of the studies by fi nancial economists dealing with Lévy processes 
focused on stable Lévy processes or had any connection with the methodology used by econophysicists. 
 
60
 It is essential to point out that Lévy processes include many classes of stochastic processes, such as the 
Wiener process, jump-diffusion processes, and jump stable Lévy processes (Variance Gamma Process, 
Madan 1990; Generalized Hyperbolic Process, Eberlein 1995; CGMY process, Carr et al. 2000). As a 
result, economists and econophysicists may use the same word for quite different models. While econo-
mists use the term “Lévy process” to defi ne (non-stable) jump-diffusion and (non-stable) jump stable Lévy 
models, econophysicists use this word to defi ne stable Lévy processes. Moreover, all papers dedicated to 
Lévy processes in fi nancial journals have been written by mathematicians or fi nancial economists and not 
by physicists. The semantic difference is a source of debates between econophysicists and economists. The 
fi rst often claim that they offer a new perspective on fi nance, while the latter consider that this approach is 
an old issue in fi nance. The point is that these two categories of specialists are not talking about the same 
thing: econophysicists use stable Lévy processes, while economists abandoned this kind of processes in the 
1970s (Jovanovic and Schinckus  2013 ). 
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 This critique was published in a physics journal by economists who do not themselves subscribe to the 
mainstream approach of fi nancial economics. 
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this point into account. Indeed, because econophysicists’ focus is on mathematical 
development, very few of them have attempted to make their models compatible with 
the framework and hypotheses of fi nancial economics.  62  One who has made the attempt 
to connect econophysics with fi nancial economics is Bouchaud—see, for instance, 
Bouchaud and Potters ( 2003 ). 
 As a result, the leading economics and fi nance journals make very few references to 
the work of econophysicists. Gingras and Schinckus ( 2012 ) looked at the ten leading 
authors in econophysics, between 2002 and 2008, and found 401 references to these 
authors in the main economics and fi nance journals as against 2506 in the main physics 
journals. This disparity highlights the fact that econophysics is not considered the 
central issue in economic journals.  63  
 One might assume that, rather than economists “rejecting” econophysicists, it is 
more a case of the latter’s having developed their models outside the fi nancial 
economics’ framework, and, hence, considering that they had no need to publish in 
mainstream economic journals or adapt their methodology and viewpoints to those of 
fi nancial economists. With the evolution of the two disciplines as analyzed in the fi rst 
part of this paper, this is no longer the case. First, we have shown that econophysicists 
have created new journals ( Quantitative Finance and  JEIC ) in economics (and not in 
physics) in order to reach fi nancial economists and an audience outside econophysics. 
Second, since econophysicists work on the same phenomena as economists, we should 
expect them to attempt publication in economics journals. To test this hypothesis, we 
conducted an informal survey, sending a questionnaire to twenty-seven leading econo-
physicists (included as source authors in our analysis) about the degree of openness of 
economics journals to econophysicists. To the question “Have you submitted a paper 
to a ranked journal in economics?”, a large majority of authors replied “yes.” When 
authors were asked to give the main reasons  64  why their paper was rejected, they 
replied that referees in economic journals often have diffi culties with the topic or/and 
the method used in their paper. Although based on a small sample (but including the 
central fi gures of econophysics), these results strongly suggest that economic journals 
are indeed reluctant to publish papers dedicated to econophysics. The lack of discussion 
between the two approaches could explain this situation, because no bridges are built 
between them. 
 Nevertheless, in 2008, the  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control published a 
special issue entitled  Applications of Statistical Physics in Economics and Finance. 
Doyne Farmer and Thomas Lux  65  were guest editors for this special issue, articles 
for which were written by economists and physicists. This special issue aimed to 
“overcome the lack of communication between economists and econophysicists” 
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 In addition, as Rosser (2008b, p.10) points out, econophysics’ models “are only of exchange and do not 
allow for production, and they often confuse basic concepts such as transactions and income, this latter 
especially for models of income and wealth distribution.” 
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 For example, only three references to key writers on econophysics are found in the leading journal of 
fi nancial economics, the  Journal of Finance ( source:  Web of Science) . 
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 They had to choose between fi ve reasons for their rejection and were invited to comment on their choices: 
1) the topic of the paper, 2) the assumptions used in the paper, 3) the method used in the paper, 4) the results 
of the paper, or 5) other reasons. 
 
65
 The fi rst is a physicist and the second an economist; both were among our source authors. 
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(Farmer and Lux  2008 , p. 3). As these authors pointed out in their editorial, there is “a 
lack of communication between physicists and economists. Physicists are perhaps the 
only group of scientifi c professionals who are even more arrogant than economists, 
and in many cases the arrogance and emotions of both sides have been strongly on 
display” (Farmer and Lux  2008 , p. 3). In order to overcome the gap between the two 
camps, this special issue published twelve articles dedicated to econophysics, written 
by authors from the fi elds of economics and physics. Despite this fi rst attempt at 
dialogue, debate has still not yet really begun. 
 Among the few economics journals to publish articles about econophysics is 
 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, which recently broadened its editorial 
line to encompass the problems of complexity in economics (and consequently 
published several studies dedicated to econophysics). Other journals offi cially indexed 
under economics that regularly publish articles on econophysics include  Quantitative 
Finance , created in 2002, and  Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 
created in 2006. The creation of these two journals, both of which have an editorial 
team made up largely of econophysicists, appears to be a strategy for the dissemination 
of econophysics, the aim being to make the approach better known to an audience of 
economists (Gingras et al.  2012 ). 
 The lack of dialogue can also be connected with the closed nature of economics.  66  
Whitley ( 1986b ) portrayed economics as a “reputationally controlled work organization” 
characterized by a strong and monolithic standardization of research. He explained 
that economics is a “partitioned bureaucracy” whose segmentation into several 
subfi elds allows it to marginalize all anomalies or empirical contradictions of the 
mainstream. Economics appears as a conservative novelty-producing system since it 
rewards intellectual innovation only if it is directly in line with the dominant research. 
All new fi elds that are not in accordance with the scientifi c standards used by the 
mainstream are simply ignored. In this perspective, the conceptual basis of econo-
physics could come only from outside the fi eld of economics and be promoted by 
physicists who saw that the kind of distribution behind economic and fi nancial 
phenomena, which are a collective response of the interactions of a large number of 
agents, are analogous to the distributions observed in condensed-matter physics as 
the result of the collective interactions of a large number of atoms. Starting from that 
analogy, they applied the methods of statistical mechanics, which explain the emergence 
of these distributions, to the case of economic and fi nancial behavior. Such a move 
radically transforms the understanding of economics, as the usual Gaussian framework 
is replaced by a Lévy framework whose statistical properties are very different and are 
not necessarily consistent with the conceptual foundation of mainstream economics, 
based on equilibrium. Moreover, while economic theory is based on an atomistic 
reductionism in which reality must be explained in terms of rational representative 
agents, econophysics focuses on the interactions that give rise to complex phenomena 
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 Pieters and Hans (2002) explored intra- and interdisciplinary communication of economics journals by 
means of citations analysis. They showed that the fi rst tier of economics journals did not cite articles 
published in journals of management, marketing, anthropology, or psychology between 1995 and 1997. 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT26
that can be described through interactions between their parts.  67  These conceptual 
differences, coupled with the difference in disciplinary training between economists 
and econophysicists, have contributed to the development of econophysics as a 
separate scientifi c culture whose roots stayed in physics instead of developing out of 
economics, like other new specialties such as behavioral fi nance and experimental 
economics. 
 There is, thus, a dynamic of repulsion between economics and econophysics: as 
Whitley observed, “economics has a strong hierarchy of journals” (Whitley  1986b , 
p. 192), and researchers who do not conform to the dominant standards are bound 
to publish outside that core and, therefore, be seen as irrelevant to the core, and conse-
quently forced to publish in new journals not recognized by the mainstream of the 
discipline. Whereas this tendency could have given rise to a new speciality among the 
social sciences, the fact that the tools of econophysics were imported from physics, 
and that econophysics was prepared to accept the modeling of social phenomena as 
legitimate—thus enlarging its scope and possible job market—brought econophysics 
under the wing of physics as it fi rst grew by using existing physics journals for 
publication and physics departments as training ground for the new breed of “econo-
physicists” (Gingras et al.  2012 ). We are seeing the emergence of a veritable scientifi c 
community independent of fi nancial economics with its own academic courses, its 
own symposiums, and journals that are recognized in the fi eld of physics. 
 In Whitley’s view, the lack of openness displayed by economics is designed to 
preserve the dominant theoretical framework and to marginalize anomalies that are 
likely to challenge the discipline: “as long as the theoretical establishment is able to 
dismiss ‘anomalies’ and diffi culties as peripheral and the province of ‘applied’ sub-
fi elds and yet retain control of the assessment of research competence in all areas, 
fundamental change seems improbable” (Whitley  1986a , p. 204). This closed attitude 
in economics considerably restricts the scope for econophysics to win over fi nancial 
economists. Moreover, physics shares the same closed-mindedness: according to the 
 Science and Engineering Indicator s (2000, p. 103, table 6–54), economics is the most 
hermetic fi eld of the social sciences, with more than 87% of intra-disciplinary references 
compared to 50% in sociology. This is even more self-contained than physics, which 
cite physics journals in about 80% of their references. These data are consistent with 
Whitley’s ( 1986b ) characterization of economics as a “partitioned bureaucracy” 
with a strong control over its theoretical core. Consequently, econophysicists have 
developed a closed attitude about fi nancial economics. 
 The Refusal of Econophysicists to Incorporate the Framework of Financial Economics 
 As we have explained, from a statistical point of view, econophysics makes it possible 
to generalize the models used by the proponents of fi nancial economics. However, up 
to now, most econophysicists have rejected the framework of fi nancial economics 
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 Econophysicists consider that particles (individuals) do not interact equally with each other because 
interactions depend on the distance between the particles. Therefore, as a function of their positions in the 
system, particles will interact and create different structures (molecules, crystals, etc.). The system will 
then be self-evolving and complex. Because atoms do not think, econophysicists consider that “market 
components” (including traders, speculators, and hedgers) obey statistical properties. See Schinckus 
( 2010a ) for a presentation of the main differences between economics and econophysics. 
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because they consider it “too axiomatic and formal to deal with complex systems” 
(Challet, Marsili , et al. 2005, p. 14). Even some economists (Keen  2003 , p. 110) claim 
that all the key concepts (utility, perfect rationality, perfect competition, etc.) used in 
fi nancial economics are “nonsense.” They are unobservable terms without an empirical 
base. Indeed, despite the fact that experiments exist in economics (Holt and Davis 
 2005 ), all key concepts of economics cannot be directly confi rmed because, according 
to econophysicists, these concepts result from apriorism. In this perspective, the key 
notions of economics are considered as “empirically fl awed” (Keen  2003 , p. 109). For 
instance, the existence of equilibrium, which is a keystone of fi nancial economics, has 
no foundation for econophysicists. In econophysics, equilibrium is rather considered 
as a potential state of the system because “there is no empirical evidence for equilibrium” 
seen as a fi nal state of the system (McCauley  2004 , p. 6). For econophycisists, 
economic equilibrium appears as an  a priori belief  68  that provides a “standardized 
approach and a standardized language in which to explain each conclusion” (Farmer 
and Geanakoplos  2009 , p. 17). 
 From a purely econophysics perspective, the fi nancial market, like physical bodies, 
moves through different “phases,” which likewise display chaotic or coherent states. 
The evolution of phases and phase changes are, therefore, represented by a trajectory 
in this space. In accordance with chaos theory, physicists observe that, if one waits 
long enough, systems of this type tend to move through states that are neighboring or 
comparable to those they have been through in the past. In phase-diagram terms, the 
system is said to tend towards what is known as a “strange attractor.” This strange 
attractor cannot be assimilated into an equilibrium in the strict meaning of the term; 
rather, it is a geometric zone through which the system passes regularly.  69  The concept 
of strange attractor, taken directly from chaos theory, neatly sums up the idea that 
econophysicists have of the concept of equilibrium—which, in general, is explicitly 
rejected. “There is no empirical proof of the existence of a stable equilibrium,” explains 
McCauley (2004, p. 6). In his view, the importance placed on this notion is more the 
result of an ideology or a belief than of an observation of reality (McCauley  2004 , 
p. 295). He goes so far as to use the idea of non-equilibrium to distinguish fi nance 
theory from economics:
 Standard economic theory and standard fi nance theory have entirely different origins 
and show very little, if any, theoretical overlap. The former, with no empirical basis 
for its postulates, is based on idea of equilibrium, whereas fi nance theory is motivated 
by, and deals from the start with, empirical data and modeling via nonequilibrium 
stochastic dynamics. (McCauley  2004 , p. 6) 
 Mandelbrot (2005, p. 143) adds:
 Let us return to fl uctuations in fi nance; where do we see an economic equilibrium that is 
the equivalent of normal thermodynamic equilibrium? I quickly developed the feeling that 
the notion of economic equilibrium is devoid of content and that, to describe price 
variation, it will not be suffi cient to modify benign chance by incorporating new details. 
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 See Schinckus ( 2011a ) for further information about the importance of equilibrium in econophysics. 
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 This term remains to be defi ned on the basis of the nature of the phenomenon under study. 
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 McCauley (2004, p. 78) explains that the concept of equilibrium used in economics 
is of Newtonian inspiration (classical mechanics), whereas the idea of non-equilibrium 
owes more to the logics of statistical mechanics. From this point of view, investors are 
particles with complex and heterogeneous behavior, operating in a system (the market) 
whose macroscopic state can be characterized statistically (by Lévy laws) by a set of 
values (asset prices) that are transitory (non-equilibrium). “This low-level complexity 
(which is in a way microscopic) [at the individual level] can, under certain conditions, 
cause surprising and not disorderly effects at the macroscopic (collective) level” 
(Brandouy  2005 , p. 122). This macroscopic perception of non-equilibrium as the sole 
explanation of the system’s microscopic states is directly inspired by thermodynamic 
models  70  and not by economics. This difference between economics and physics is 
also highlighted by Ruelle (1991, p. 113), and suggests that the notion of non-equilibrium 
could prove highly useful for the study of certain economic phenomena. Ball 
(2006, p. 687) adds that “equilibrium is the heart of the dominant economics whereas 
most models taken from econophysics are explicitly based on the concept of nonequi-
librium.” The rejection of the theory and hypotheses of economics does not facilitate 
theoretical exchanges, and contributes to the absence of debate alluded to in our 
previous section. The studies put forward by econophysicists are not presented as 
improvements but rather as new models to replace current economic models purely 
and simply. Economists, for their part, prefer to remain aloof from this “methodological 
imperialism” by publishing no (or few) articles on econophysics (Gingras et al.  2012 ). 
 This rejection of the theoretical framework of fi nancial economics leads econo-
physicists to discard the discipline’s main concepts and theories, as McCauley points 
out: “Econophysicists are safer to ignore the lessons taught in standard economic texts 
(both micro-macro) than to learn the economists’ production ideas and take them 
seriously” (2006, p. 608). 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 In the 1960s, Mandelbrot ( 1963 , 1965) and Fama ( 1965a ) emphasized the leptokurticity of 
empirical distributions and proposed describing the empirical distribution with stable 
Lévy processes. Although these processes appeared to be adequate for the statistical 
description of fi nancial distribution, they were not developed at that time because they 
have infi nite variance, and fi nancial economists did not have the statistical tools to 
allow them to describe empirical distributions with a stable Lévy framework. 
 Since then, fi nancial economics has attempted to integrate Lévy processes into its 
modeling (Matacz  2000 , Tankov  2004 ). However, these attempts were founded on 
non-stable Lévy processes. In the 1990s, new statistical tools were developed with the 
aim of creating stable Lévy processes with fi nite variance. Econophysical works 
are directly in line with these new statistical tools. That is the point explained in this 
article, which has also shown how the development of a new way of collecting data 
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 That is, a dynamic equilibrium in perpetual modifi cation. There have also been attempts to unify the con-
cept of equilibrium in microeconomics and in thermodynamics—see Sousa and Domingos ( 2006 ) on this 
subject. Nevertheless, these analogies are purely “axiomatic and conceptual” (Sousa et al. 2006, p. 162). 
They have not, for the time being at least, led to the study of particular economic or fi nancial phenomena. 
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(intraday) has favored the emergence of econophysics. In a sense, this new fi eld can 
be seen as the result of the technological and theoretical evolution of fi nance. This 
evolution was initiated by the fi rst attempts of fi nancial economists, but also by the 
purely mathematical framework developed by Harrison and Pliska ( 1981 ), who 
proposed a non-economic model in fi nance. Harrison and Pliska, in fact, provided an 
entry point for a less economics-based evolution of modern fi nance. As a result, from 
a mathematical viewpoint, the models developed by econophysicists continue from 
where those developed by fi nancial economists left off. In one respect, econophysics 
has benefi ted from standing outside fi nancial economics: this position means that they 
are not subject to the constraints of the theoretical framework, giving them greater 
freedom to develop new mathematical tools. And yet, the evolution of fi nancial 
economics suggests that econophysicists might successfully infi ltrate fi nancial 
economics and, consequently, become the next dominant approach in fi nancial economics. 
Recent work by fi nancial economists to integrate Lévy processes could build bridges 
between the two approaches. These attempts to integrate Lévy processes into the 
framework of fi nancial economics are a challenge for that discipline. 
 This paper also shows how econophysics and fi nancial economics have historical 
similarities in their emergence process. In the 1960s, chartists and fundamentalists 
were marginalized in academic circles by fi nancial economists. Since the 1990s, fi nancial 
economists have been challenged by econophysicists, who suggest that they can 
supplant them using the same arguments that they themselves used in the 1960s. In 
other words, econophysicists are suggesting that their assumptions, their theoretical 
framework, and their results could serve as a reference point, with the result that 
current mainstream fi nancial economics will position itself in relation to them. This 
attempt to supplant the dominant approach by the new theoretical fi eld, combined with 
the importance of statistical tools, indicates some historical similarities between the 
emergence of both fi elds. 
 However, despite these similarities, we have highlighted aspects in econophysics’ 
theoretical framework, results, and hypotheses that are obstacles to its bid to become 
the mainstream approach in fi nancial economics. 
 While econophysics is an important challenge for fi nancial economics, we observe 
a major difference between fi nancial economics in the 1960s and econophysics today. 
Financial economists took over the business schools by marginalizing rival groups. 
This is not the case with econophysicists, who do not seem to be able to marginalize 
the dominant approach in fi nancial economics. Rather, they appear to be attempting to 
carve out a place for themselves inside modern fi nancial theory. However, to strengthen 
this position, bridges still need to be built between fi nancial economics and econo-
physics; but that is another story. 
 REFERENCES 
 Angrist ,  Joshua D. , and  Jörn-Steffen  Pischke .  2008 .  Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion .  Princeton :  Princeton University Press . 
 Archer ,  Stephen H .  1968 . “ Introduction .”  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis  3 ( 3 ):  231 – 233 . 
 Bachelier ,  Louis .  1900 .  “Théorie de la spéculation.” Reproduced in  Annales de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, 
3ème série 17(January): 21–86. Reprint, 1995, J. Gabay, Paris . 
 Ball ,  Philip .  2006 . “ Econophysics: Culture Crash .”  Nature  441 , 7094:  686 – 688 . 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT30
 Barber ,  Brad , and  Terrance  Odean .  2001 . “ The Internet and the Investor .”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 
 15 ( 1 ):  41 – 54 . 
 Barberousse ,  Anouk , and  Pascal  Ludvig .  2000 . “ Les modèles comme fi ctions .”  Philosophie  68 (Décembre): 
 16 – 43 . 
 Belkacem ,  Lotfi  .  1996 .  Processus stables et applications en fi nance .  Université Paris IX Dauphine :  Paris . 
 Bernstein ,  Peter L .  1992 .  Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street .  New York and 
Toronto :  Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International . 
 Bingham ,  Nicholas Hugh .  2005 . “ Doob: A Half-century On .”  Journal of Applied Probabilities  42 ( 1 ): 
 257 – 266 . 
 Bouchaud ,  Jean-Philippe , and  Marc  Potters .  2003 .  Theory of Financial Risk and Derivate Pricing . 
 Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press . 
 Bouchaud ,  Jean-Philippe , and  Marc  Potters .  2002 . “ An Introduction to Statistical Finance .”  Physica A  313 
( 1 ):  238 – 251 . 
 Brandouy ,  Olivier .  2005 . “ Complexité et phénomènes critiques en fi nance .” In  David  Bourghelle ,  Olivier 
 Brandouy ,  Roland  Gillet , and  André  Orléan , eds.,  Croyances, Représentations Collectives et 
Conventions en Finance .  Paris :  Economica . 
 Bucsa ,  Gigel ,  Franck  Jovanovic , and  Christophe  Schinckus  2010 . “ A Unifi ed Model for Price Return 
Distributions Used in Econophysics .”  Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications  390 ( 20 ): 
 3435 – 3443 . 
 Burda ,  Zdzislaw ,  Jerzy  Jurkiewicz , and  Maciej A.  Nowak  2003 . “ Is Econophysics a Solid Science? ”  Acta 
Physica Polonica B  34 ( 1 ):  87 . 
 Cartwright ,  Nancy .  1983 .  How the Laws of Physics Lie .  Oxford :  Oxford University Press . 
 Challet ,  Damien ,  Mateo  Marsili ,  et al .  2005 .  Minority Games: Interacting Agents in Financial Markets . 
 Oxford :  Oxford University Press . 
 Clegg ,  Richard .  2006 . “ A Practical Guide to Measuring the Hurst Parameter .”  International Journal of 
Simulation: Systems, Science & Technology  7 ( 1 ):  3 – 14 . 
 Cohen ,  Kalman J. , and  Jerry A.  Pogue .  1967 . “ An Empirique Evaluation of Alternative Portfolio-Selection 
Models .”  Journal of Business  40 ( 2 ):  166 – 193 . 
 Cootner ,  Paul H .  1964 .  The Random Character of Stock Market Prices .  Cambridge, MA :  MIT Press . 
 Cowles ,  Alfred .  1933 . “ Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast? ”  Econometrica  1 ( 3 ):  309 – 324 . 
 Cowles ,  Alfred. , and  Herbert E.  Jones .  1937 . “ Some A Posteriori Probabilities in Stock Market Action .” 
 Econometrica  5 ( 3 ):  280 – 294 . 
 Davis ,  Mark , and  Alison  Etheridge .  2006 .  Louis Bachelier’s Theory of Speculation .  Princeton and Oxford : 
 Princeton University Press . 
 Engle ,  Robert , and  Jeff  Russell .  2004 .  “Analysis of High Frequency Financial Data.” University of Chicago 
Working Paper . 
 Engle ,  Robert F .  1982 . “ Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of Variance of 
United Kingdom Infl ation .”  Econometrica  50 ( 4 ):  987 – 1008 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  1963 . “ Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian Hypothesis .”  Journal of Business  36 ( 4 ):  420 – 429 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  1965 a. “ Portfolio Analysis in a Stable Paretian Market .”  Management Science  11 ( 3 ):  404 – 419 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  1965 b. “ The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices .”  Journal of Business  38 ( 1 ):  34 – 105 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  1965 c. “ Random Walks in Stock-Market Prices .”  Financial Analysts Journal  21 ( 5 ):  55 – 59 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  1970 . “ Effi cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work .”  Journal of 
Finance  25 ( 2 ):  383 – 417 . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F .  2008 .  Interview with Professor Eugene Fama by Professor Richard Roll .  The American 
Finance Association’s website . 
 Fama ,  Eugene F. , and  Merton H.  Miller .  1972 .  The Theory of Finance .  New York :  Holt Rinehart and Winston . 
 Farmer ,  Doyne , and  John  Geanakoplos .  2009 . “ The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium, and the Future of 
Financial Economics .”  Complexity (Jan/Feb 2009),  14 ( 3 ):  11 – 38 . 
 Farmer ,  Doyne and  Thomas  Lux .  2008 .  “Introduction” to special issue  Application of Statistical Physics in 
Economics and Finance .  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control  32 ( 1 ):  1 – 6 . 
ECONOPHYSICS: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMICS? 31
 Feller ,  William .  1971 .  An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications .  New York :  Wiley . 
 Fisher ,  Lawrence , and  James H.  Lorie .  1964 . “ Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks .”  Journal 
of Business  37 ( 1 ):  1 – 21 . 
 Fourcade ,  Marion , and  Rakesh  Khurana .  2009 .  “From Social Control to Financial Economics: The Linked 
Ecologies of Economics and Business in Twentieth-Century America.” Working Paper, Harvard Business 
School . 
 Fredrikson ,  E. Bruce. [1965]  1971 .  Frontiers of Investment Analysis .  Scranton, PA :  International 
Textbook Co . 
 Frickel ,  Scott , and  Neil  Gross .  2005 . “ A General Theory of Scientifi c/Intellectual Movements .”  American 
Sociological Review  70 ( 2 ):  204 – 232 . 
 Frisch ,  Uriel ,  Michael  Shlesinger ,  et al .  1994 .  Lévy Flight and Related Topics in Physics .  Berlin :  Springer . 
 Gallegati ,  Mauro ,  Steve  Keen ,  et al .  2006 . “ Worrying Trends in Econophysics .”  Physica A  370 ( 1 ):  1 – 6 . 
 Gingras ,  Yves , and  Christophe  Schinckus .  2012 . “ Institutionalization of Econophysics in the Shadow of 
Physics .”  Journal of the History of Economic Thought  34 ( 1 ):  109 – 130 . 
 Gnedenko ,  Boris  Vladimirovich , and  Andrei N.  Kolmogorov .  1954 .  Limit Distributions for Sums of 
Independent Random Variables .  Cambridge :  Addison-Wesley . 
 Gupta ,  Hari , and  José  Campanha .  1999 . “ The Gradually Truncated Lévy Flight for Systems with 
Power-Law Distributions .”  Physica A  268 :  231 – 239 . 
 Gupta ,  Hari , and  José  Campanha .  2002 . “ Tsallis Statistics and Gradually Truncated Lévy Flight—
Distribution of an Economic Index .”  Physica A  309 ( 4 ):  381 – 387 . 
 Harrison ,  J. Michael , and  David M.  Kreps .  1979 . “ Martingales and Arbitrage in Multiperiod Securities 
Markets .”  Journal of Economic Theory  20 ( 3 ):  381 – 408 . 
 Harrison ,  J. Michael , and  Stanley R.  Pliska .  1981 . “ Martingales and Stochastic Integrals in the Theory of 
Continuous Trading .”  Stochastic Processes and their Applications  11 ( 3 ):  215 – 260 . 
 Hoffl and ,  D. L .  1967 . “ The Folklore of Wall Street .”  Financial Analysts Journal  23 ( 3 ):  85 – 88 . 
 Holt ,  Charles , and  Douglas  Davis .  2005 .  Experimental Economics .  Princeton :  Princeton University Press . 
 Huang ,  Jing-Zhi , and  Liuren  Wu .  2004 . “ Specifi cation Analysis of Option Pricing Based on Time-Changed 
Lévy Process .”  Econometrica  59 ( 3 ):  1405 – 1439 . 
 Jean ,  William H .  1970 .  The Analytical Theory of Finance; A Study of the Investment Decision Process of 
the Individual and the Firm .  New York :  Holt, Rinehart . 
 Jensen ,  Michael C .  1978 . “ Some Anomalous Evidence regarding Market Effi ciency .”  Journal of Financial 
Economics  6 ( 2–3 ):  95 – 101 . 
 Jiang ,  Guorong ,  Nancy  Tang ,  et al .  2002 .  Electronic Trading in Hong Kong and Its Impact on Market 
Functioning .  Basel :  Bank for International Settlements . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2000 . “ L’origine de la théorie fi nancière: une réévaluation de l’apport de Louis 
Bachelier .”  Revue d’Economie Politique  110 ( 3 ):  395 – 418 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2001 . “ Pourquoi l’hypothèse de marche aléatoire en théorie fi nancière? Les raisons 
historiques d’un choix éthique .”  Revue d’Economie Financière  61 :  203 – 211 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2006 . “ A Nineteenth-century Random Walk: Jules Regnault and the Origins of 
Scientifi c Financial Economics .” In  Geoffrey  Poitras , ed.,  Pioneers of Financial Economics . Volume 
 1 .  Cheltenham :  Edward Elgar , pp.  191 – 222 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2008 . “ The Construction of the Canonical History of Financial Economics .”  History of 
Political Economy  40 ( 2 ):  213 – 242 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck ., ed.  2009 a.  L’institutionnalisation de l’économie fi nancière: perspectives historiques . 
 Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines  20 (special issue):  3 – 157 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2009 b. “ Le modèle de marche aléatoire dans l’économie fi nancière de 1863 à 1976 .” 
 Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines  20 :  81 – 108 . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2010 . “ Effi cient Markets Theory .” In  Rama  Cont , ed.,  Encyclopedia of Quantitative 
Finance .  Chichester, UK :  John Wiley & Sons . 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck .  2012 . “ Bachelier: Not the Forgotten Forerunner He Has Been Depicted As .”  European 
Journal for the History of Economic Thought  19 ( 2 ):  431 – 451 . 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT32
 Jovanovic ,  Franck. , and  Christophe  Schinckus .  2013 . “ The Emergence of Econophysics .”  History of 
Political Economy  45 ( 2 ): forthcoming. 
 Jovanovic ,  Franck. , and  Christophe  Schinckus .  2010 .  Financial Economics’ Birth in 1960s . Working paper . 
 Keen ,  Steve .  2003 . “ Standing on the Toes of Pygmies: Why Econophysics Must Be Careful of the Economic 
Foundations on Which It Builds .”  Physica A  324 ( 1 ):  108 – 116 . 
 Kendall ,  Maurice George .  1953 . “ The Analysis of Economic Time-Series. Part I: Prices .”  Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society  116 :  11 – 25 . 
 Kennedy ,  Robert E .  1966 . “ Financial Analysts Seminar .”  Financial Analysts Journal  22 ( 6 ):  8 – 9 . 
 Kou ,  S .  2008 .  “Lévy Process in Asset Pricing.” Columbia University Working Paper . 
 Kuhn ,  Thomas  1962 .  The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions .  Chicago :  The University of Chicago Press . 
 Kutner ,  Ryszard , and  Dariusz  Grech .  2008 . “ Report on Foundation and Organization of Econophysics 
Graduate Courses at Faculty of Physics of University of Warsaw and Department of Physics and 
Astronomy of the Wrocław University .”  Acta Physica Polonica A  114 ( 3 ):  637 – 647 . 
 Lévy ,  Paul .  1924 . “ Théorie des erreurs: la loi de Gauss et les lois exceptionnelles .”  Bulletion de la SMF 
 2 ( 1 ):  49 – 85 . 
 Lorie ,  James H .  1966 . “ Some Comments on Recent Quantitative and Formal Research on the Stock 
Market .”  Journal of Business  39 , 1(Part 2: Supplement on Security Prices):  107 – 110 . 
 Lorie ,  James H .  1965 .  “Controversies on the Stock Market.” Selected Papers, Graduate School of Business 
of the University of Chicago . 
 Lorie ,  James H. , and  Richard A.  Brealey .  1972 .  Modern Developments in Investment Management: A Book 
of Readings .  New York :  Praeger . 
 Louçã ,  Francisco .  2007 .  The Years of High Aconometrics. A Short History of the Generation that Reinvented 
Economics .  London :  Routledge . 
 MacKenzie ,  Donald A .  2006 .  An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets .  Cambridge, 
MA :  MIT Press . 
 Mandelbrot ,  Benoit .  1963 . “ The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices .”  Journal of Business  36 ( 4 ): 
 394 – 419 . 
 Mandelbrot ,  Benoit .  1965 . “ Very Long-tailed Probability Distributions and the Empirical Distribution of 
City Sizes . In  F.  Massarik and  P.  Ratoosh , eds.,  Mathematical Explanations in Behavioral Science . 
 New York :  Homewood Editions , pp.  322 – 332 . 
 Mandelbrot ,  Benoit .  1966 . “ Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and ‘Martingale’ Models .” 
 Journal of Business  39 , 1(Part 2):  242 – 255 . 
 Mandelbrot ,  Benoit .  1997 .  Fractals, Hasard et Finance .  Paris :  Flammarion . 
 Mandelbrot ,  Benoit .  2005 .  Une approche fractale des marchés .  Paris :  Editions Odile Jacob . 
 Mantegna ,  Rosario N. , and  Eugene H.  Stanley .  1999 .  An introduction to Econophysics .  New York : 
 Cambridge University Press . 
 Mao ,  James C. T .  1969 .  Quantitative Analysis of Financial Decisions .  New York :  Macmillan . 
 Markowitz ,  Harry M .  1999 . “ The Early History of Portfolio Theory: 1600–1960 .”  Financial Analysts 
Journal  55 ( 4 ):  5 – 16 . 
 Markowitz ,  Harry M .  1952 . “ Portfolio Selection .”  Journal of Finance  7 ( 1 ):  77 – 91 . 
 Markowitz ,  Harry M .  2004 .  “Harry Markowitz Interview.”  www.afajof.org 
 Marsili ,  Mateo , and  Yi-Chen  Zhang .  1998 . “ Econophysics: What Can Physicists Contribute to Economics? ” 
 Physics Review Letters  80 ( 1 ):  80 – 85 . 
 Matacz ,  Andrew .  2000 . “ Financial Modeling and Option Theory with the Truncated Levy Process .” 
 International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance  3 ( 1 ):  142 – 160 . 
 McCauley ,  Joseph L .  2004 .  Dynamics of Markets: Econophysics and Finance .  Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press . 
 McCauley ,  Joseph L .  2006 . “ Response to ‘Worrying Trends in Econophysics.’ ”  Physica A  371 ( 1 ):  601 – 609 . 
 Mehrling ,  Perry .  2005 .  Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of Finance .  Hoboken :  John Wiley & Sons . 
 Mehrling ,  Perry .  2012 . “ Financial Economics .” In  Gilbert  Faccarello and  Heinz  Kurz , eds.,  Handbook of 
the History of Economic Analysis  Cheltenhem :  Edward Elgar . Forthcoming. 
ECONOPHYSICS: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMICS? 33
 Merton ,  Robert C .  1976 . “ Option Pricing When Underlying Stock Returns Are Discontinuous .”  Journal of 
Financial Economics  3 ( 1–2 ):  125 – 144 . 
 Mitzenmacher ,  Michael .  2004 . “ A Brief History of Generative Models for Power Law and Lognormal 
Distributions .”  Internet Mathematics  1 ( 2 ):  226 – 251 . 
 Moore ,  Basil J .  1968 .  An Introduction to the Theory of Finance; Assetholder Behavior under Uncertainty . 
 New York :  Free Press . 
 Morgan ,  Mary S. , and  Margaret  Morrison , eds.  1999 .  Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and 
Social Science .  Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press . 
 Nadeau ,  Robert .  1995 . “ Thomas Kuhn ou l’apogée de la philosophie historique des sciences ”. In  Jean-
Pierre  Cometti and  Claudine  Tiercelin , eds.,  Actes du colloque du Centre Culturel International de 
Cerisy-la-Salle sur “Cent ans de philosophie américaine.”  http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/philuqam/
dept/page_perso.php?id=13 ) 
 National Science Board .  2000 .  Science and Engineering Indicators 2000 .  Arlington :  National Science 
Foundation . 
 Pieters ,  Riek , and  Hans  Baumgartner .  2002 . “ Who Talks to Whom? Intra- and Interdisciplinary 
Communication of Economics Journals .”  Journal of Economic Literature  40 ( 2 ):  483 – 509 . 
 Poitras ,  Geoffrey , ed.  2006 .  Pioneers of Financial Economics: Contributions Prior to Irving Fisher . 
 Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA :  Edward Elgar . 
 Poitras ,  Geoffrey , ed.  2010 . “ Pioneers of Financial Economics: Das Adam Smith Irrelevanzproblem? ” 
 History of Economics Review  51 (Winter):  43 – 64 . 
 Poitras ,  Geoffrey , and  Franck  Jovanovic , eds.  2007 .  Pioneers of Financial Economics: Twentieth-Century 
Contributions .  Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA :  Edward Elgar . 
 Renfro ,  Charles G .  2004 . “ The Early Development of Econometric Modeling Languages .” In  Charles G. 
 Renfro , ed.,  Computational Econometrics: Its Impact on the Development of Quantitative .  Amsterdam : 
 IOS Press , pp.  145 – 166 . 
 Renfro ,  Charles G .  2009 .  The Practice of Econometric Theory: An Examination of the Characteristics of 
Econometric Computation .  Heidelberg :  Springer . 
 Roehner ,  Bertrand .  2002 .  Patterns of Speculation: A Study in Observational Econophysics.  Cambridge : 
 Cambridge University Press . 
 Rosenfeld ,  Lawrence .  1957 . “ Electronic Computers and Their Place in Securities Analyses .”  The Analysts 
Journal  13 ( 1 ):  51 – 53 . 
 Rosser ,  Barkley .  2006 . “ The Nature and Future of Econophysics .” In  Arnab  Chatterjee and 
 Bikas K.  Chakrabarti , eds.,  Econophysics of Stock and Other Markets .  Milan :  Springer , pp.  225 – 234 . 
 Rosser ,  Barkley .  2008 a. “ Econophysics and Economics Complexity .”  Advances in Complex Systems 
 11 ( 5 ):  745 – 760 . 
 Rosser ,  Barkley .  2008 b. “ Debating the Role of Econophysics .”  Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology & Life 
Sciences  12 ( 3 ):  311 – 323 . 
 Roy ,  A. D .  1952 . “ Safety First and the Holding of Assets .”  Econometrica  20 ( 3 ):  431 – 449 . 
 Rubinstein ,  Mark .  2002 . “ Markowitz’s ‘Portfolio Selection’: A Fifty-Year Retrospective .”  Journal of 
Finance  62 ( 3 ):  1041 – 1045 . 
 Ruelle ,  David .  1991 .  Hasard et Chaos .  Paris :  Editions Odile Jacobs . 
 Samuelson ,  Paul A .  1965 . “ Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly .”  Industrial 
Management Review  6 ( 2 ):  41 – 49 . 
 Schinckus ,  Christophe .  2009 . “ La fi nance comportementale ou le développement d’un nouveau paradigme .” 
 Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines  20 :  131 – 157 . 
 Schinckus ,  Christophe .  2010 a. “ Econophysics and Economics: Sister Disciplines? ”  American Journal of 
Physics  78 ( 1 ):  325 – 327 . 
 Schinckus ,  Christophe .  2010 b. “ Is Econophysics a New Discipline? A Neo-positivist Argument .”  Physica A 
 389 :  3814 – 3821 . 
 Schinckus ,  Christophe .  2011 a. “ What Can Econophysics Contribute to Financial Economics? ”  International 
Review of Economics  58 ( 2 ):  147 – 163 . 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT34
 Schinckus ,  Christophe .  2011 b.  “How Do Econophysicists Make Stable Levy Processes Physically 
Plausible.” Working paper . 
 Schoutens ,  Wim .  2003 .  Lévy Processes in Finance .  New York :  Wiley Finance . 
 Schwert ,  William G .  1989 . “ Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time? ”  Journal of Finance 
 44 ( 5 ):  1115 – 1153 . 
 Shafer ,  Glenn , and  Vladimir  Vovk .  2001 .  Probability and Finance: It’s Only a Game!  New York :  Wiley . 
 Shafer ,  Glenn , and  Vladimir  Vovk .  2005 .  “The Origins and Legacy of Kolmogorov’s Grundbegriffe.” 
Working paper . 
 Shiller ,  Robert J .  1981 a. “ The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Effi ciency .”  Journal of 
Finance  36 ( 2 ):  291 – 304 . 
 Shiller ,  Robert J .  1981 b. “ Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justifi ed by Subsequent Changes in 
Dividends? ”  American Economic Review  71 ( 3 ):  421 – 436 . 
 Sornette ,  Didier .  2003 . “ Critical Market Crashes .”  Physics Reports  378 ( 1 ):  1 – 98 . 
 Sousa ,  Tania , and  Tiago  Domingos .  2006 . “ Is Neoclassical Microeconomics Formally Valid? An Approach 
Based on an Analogy with Equilibrium Thermodynamics .”  Ecological Economics  58 ( 1 ):  160 – 169 . 
 Sprowls ,  Clay .  1963 . “ Computer Education in the Business Curriculum .”  Journal of Business  36 
( 1 ):  91 – 96 . 
 Stanley ,  Eugene ,  N.  Amaral ,  et al .  1999 . “ Econophysics: Can Physicists Contribute to the Science of 
Economics? ”  Physica A  269 ( 1 ):  156 – 169 . 
 Stanley ,  Eugene H. ,  Xavier  Gabaix ,  et al .  2008 . “ A Statistical Physics View of Financial Fluctuations: 
Evidence for Scaling Universality .”  Physica A  387 ( 1 ):  3967 – 3981 
 Stanley ,  Eugene H. ,  Nunes  Amaral ,  et al .  2000 . “ Econophysics: What Can Physicists Contribute to 
Economics? ”  International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance  3 ( 3 ):  335 – 346 . 
 Tankov ,  Peter .  2004 .  Processus de Lévy en Finance: Problèmes Inverses et Modélisation de dépendance . 
 Ecole Polytechnique de Paris :  Paris . 
 Tijms ,  Henk .  2004 .  Understanding Probability .  Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press . 
 Von Plato ,  Jan .  1994 .  Creating Modern Probability: Its Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy in Historical 
Perspective .  Cambridge, UK; New York :  Cambridge University Press . 
 Wei ,  P. ,  P. S.  Poon ,  et al .  1997 . “ The Effect of Option Listing on Bid-Ask Spreads, Price Volatility and 
Trading Activity of the Underlying OTC Stocks .”  Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
 9 ( 2 ):  165 – 180 . 
 Wendt ,  Paul F .  1966 . “ What Should We Teach in an Investments Course? ”  Journal of Finance  21 ( 2 ): 
 416 – 422 . 
 Weston ,  J. Fred .  1967 . “ The State of the Finance Field .”  Journal of Finance  22 ( 4 ):  539 – 540 . 
 Whitley ,  Richard Drummond .  1986 a. “ The Rise of Modern Finance Theory: Its Characteristics as a 
Scientifi c Field and Connection to the Changing Structure of Capital Markets .” In  Warren J.  Samuels , 
ed.,  Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology .  Stanford :  JAI Press Inc. , pp. 
 147 – 178 . 
 Whitley ,  Richard Drummond .  1986 b. “ The Structure and Context of Economics as a Scientifi c Field .” In 
 Warren J.  Samuels , ed.,  Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology .  Stanford : 
 JAI Press Inc. , pp.  179 – 209 . 
 Working ,  Holbrook .  1934 . “ A Random-Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time Series .”  Journal 
of the American Statistical Association  29 :  11 – 24 . 
 Wu ,  Hsiu-Kwang , and  Alan J.  Zakon .  1965 .  Elements of Investments .  New York :  Holt . 
 Zolotarev ,  Mikhail Ivanovich .  1986 . “ One-dimensional Stable Distributions .”  American Mathematical 
Society  (Translations of Mathematical Monographs) , Vol.  65 . Special Issue.  http://www.amazon.
com/One-Dimensional-Distributions-Translations-Mathematical-Monographs/dp/0821845195 
 
 AUTHOR QUERIES 
QA The distinction between surnames can be ambiguous, therefore to ensure 
accurate tagging for indexing purposes online (eg for PubMed entries), please 
check that the highlighted surnames have been correctly identifi ed, that all 
names are in the correct order and spelt correctly.
